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While many scholars have written about ‘spoilers,’ actors committed to the use of violence in an 
effort to undermine political negotiations, there have been few attempts to systematically test 
whether theories of spoiling behavior effectively explain armed nonstate actors’ use of force.  
Using a combination of GIS mapping, statistical analysis, and qualitative data gathered from 
interviews in Belfast, Northern Ireland, I examine the lines of division that formed within 
Northern Irish paramilitaries during the peace process of the 1990s. By focusing in particular on 
what I define as intra-movement violence, I examine the way divisions formed and test whether 
these fissures reflect a moderate-militant divide over peace negotiations. Ultimately, I find that 
evidence from Northern Ireland is more consistent with an explanation that identifies lines of 
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction and Background 
Overview 
Between 1968 and 1998 Northern Ireland’s ‘Troubles’ claimed over 3,500 lives.1 During 
these thirty years of protracted guerilla warfare and insurgency, the 5,452 square mile region 
accounted for over a quarter of the terrorist attacks in Western Europe.
2
 While the year 1972 
experienced the highest levels of violence during the Troubles with 472 deaths, 321 (68%) of 
which were civilians, the attack that claimed the most civilian lives occurred well into the 1998 
peace negotiations.
3
 On 15 August 1998, 29 civilians died in Omagh, County Tyrone during an 
explosion believed to be the work of a splinter group known as the “real” Irish Republican Army 
(rIRA).
4
 In the months following, media outlets speculated over whether the 1998 Good Friday 
Peace Agreement would survive the aftermath of the violence. Scathing condemnations of the 
“RENEGADE Republican dissidents” questioned the viability of peace by 
pointing to an Irish Republican tradition of dividing into factions of ‘dogmatic’ 
                                                          
1
 For an introduction to the Northern Ireland conflict, please reference Lawrence J. McCaffrey’s The Irish Question: 
Two Centuries of Conflict. (Lexington, University Press of Kentucky, 1995), Jonathan Tonge’s Northern Ireland, 
Conflict and Change (London: Prentice Hall Europe, 1998), and Marc Mulholland’s Northern Ireland, A Very Short 
Introduction. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
2
 Terrorism Statistics and definition of Western Europe as comprised of 25 countries (Andorra, Austria, Belgium, 
Corsica, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Vatican City, and the Federal 
Republic of Germany) from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism 
and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2013). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from 
http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd. It should be noted that, like the GTD, I treat terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland as 
separate from those that occurred in either Ireland or Great Britain (England, Scotland, Wales), although both 
countries experienced Troubles-related attacks. Additionally, the GTD does not contain any information on attacks 
from 1993 due to these records being lost before they could be digitized. 
3
 Malcolm Sutton, “An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland,1969-1993,” (October 1999) and Michael 
McKeown’s “’Remembering’: Victims, Survivors and Commemoration Post-Mortem, database and documents” 
(June 2009)., both Provided by CAIN Web Services University of Ulster. 2014. Accessed 18 April 2015. 
<http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/> 
4
 Martin Melaugh. “The Irish Peace Process – Chronology of Key Events (April 1998-December 1999),” Provided 
by CAIN Web Service. 
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While the peace process ultimately endured, the legacy of the Omagh bombing 
lingers both in an ongoing search for the perpetrators of the crime and in contemporary 
speculations about whether dissident armed actors might upset Northern Ireland’s “still 
fragile peace” and prompt a return to violence.6 Members of Britain’s House of 
Commons noted almost ten years after the Omagh bomb that “it is the fact that dissident 
republicans continue actively to seek to undermine Northern Ireland' s progress towards 
peace and normalisation that makes it so important to learn lessons from the experience 
of Omagh.”7 Such ‘spoiler violence’ serves both as a reminder of the progress that has 
yet to be made and as a deterrent to politically engaging members of what Dr. John 
Horgan has called ‘violent dissident republican’ (VDR) or hardline loyalist factions. 
How valid are these concerns that contemporary paramilitaries are intransigent 
radicals unwilling to negotiate or countenance any discussions of peace?  Is it true that, 
as George Mitchell, one of the chief peace brokers in Northern Ireland, commented 
“There is a kind of brinkmanship to Northern Ireland politics…The threat of total 
collapse is a standard part of the political repertoire there."
8
 Do such observations mean 
that the Omagh bomb evinces the idea that violence during peace negotiations “served 
                                                          
5
 “Adams must act to curb these evil renegades.” Daily Mail. 17 August 1998. Provided by Omagh Support and 
Self-Help Group Web Archive, Last Accessed: 26 Nov 2014. < http://www.omaghbomb.co.uk/> 
6
 “When troubles come” The Economist. 3 May 2014. Web. From Print Edition: Britain. Last Accessed: 26 Nov. 
2014. <http://www.economist.com/node/21601569/print> 
7
 The Gibson Review. Provided in The Omagh bombing; Some remaining questions, fourth report of session 2009-
2010, together with Formal Minutes.  Great Britain: Parliament: House of Commons: Northern Ireland Affairs 
Committee. HC374.29, 10 March 2016. Web. Last Accessed: 26 Nov. 2014 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200910/cmselect/cmniaf/374/37404.htm#n29> 
8
 LuAnn Bishop, “George Mitchell: Peace in Northern Ireland is 'remarkably fragile and remarkably enduring'” Yale 




merely to undermine the republican political project and were counterproductive even in 
terms of the then self-defined ‘ballot box and armalite’ strategy of the republican armed 
struggle”?9 Or, are tragedies like Omagh, which “[lay] bare for all to see the brutality, 
the senselessness, the utter insanity of political violence,” requisites for achieving a 
lasting commitment to political settlement?
10
  More broadly, why does violence persist 
during periods of ceasefire and political negotiation and how does one characterize the 
violence that occurs? Examining political violence in Northern Ireland after the 
paramilitary ceasefires of the 1990s offers not only answers to the preceding questions 
but also new insights into the more general processes of factionalization and coalitional 
dissolution. 
While some argue that Northern Ireland is a unique case and that its utility as a 
model for peacebuilding has been overstated, the fact remains that in most cases of 
substate conflict, negotiators inevitably reference a ‘Northern Ireland model’ or make 
comparisons between Northern Ireland and other conflicts around the world.  In 2014, 
Colombian president, Juan Miguel Santos, adopted a new strategy towards negotiations 
with FARC, a rebel group against which Colombia’s government has been waging what 
is alleged to be the world’s longest running civil war. He noted  that "The preliminary 
agreement we announced with the FARC was inspired by the framework agreement with the 
IRA.”11 A year earlier, American President Barack Obama hailed Northern Ireland as “an 
                                                          
9
 Peter Hain, “Peacemaking in Northern Ireland: A model for conflict resolution?” Speech at Chatham House. 12 
June 2007. Transcript. Provided by CAIN Web Service. 
10
 Provided in Richard English’s Armed Struggle the History of the IRA (London: Pan Macmillan, 2004)., 318 
11
 Victoria O’Hara, “Colombia adopts Northern Ireland peace process model in bid to end civil war” Belfast 
Telegraph. 18 March 2014. Web. Last Accessed: 19 April 2014. 
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example for those who seek a peace of their own…their blueprint to follow.”12 That same year, 
the Lord Mayor of Belfast presented the keynote address at a San Sebastián conference on 
peacebuilding and the Basque country, where the Northern Ireland peace process was a central 
topic of discussion.
13
 Given the frequency with which the Northern Ireland peace process 
continues to emerge in discussions of contemporary politics, it is important to 
understand why and how the peace process played out the way it did. Furthermore, it is 
only by studying the intricacies of this conflict that one can effectively identify the 
elements of the peace process that were unique to Northern Ireland and those that have 
the potential to assist other efforts at conflict negotiation.  
There is an additional benefit to studying historical cases of paramilitary coalition 
building and fractionalization during peace negotiations such as Northern Ireland 
because, in these cases, it is possible to trace almost a full life cycle of armed nonstate 
organizations.  The problem with many historical cases, however, is that scholars 
generally analyzed these events using the tools available during or directly following the 
conflict. Since the early twenty-first century, a wealth of scholarship and research has 
emerged around the way that armed nonstate actors organize. In light of these new 
theories, scholars could benefit from reexamining earlier cases on insurgency, substate-
warfare, and paramilitarism.  
In this study, I examine the use of violence during the Northern Irish Peace 
Process. In doing so, I test theories of why armed nonstate groups continue pursuing 
                                                          
12
 “REMARKS BY PRESIDENT OBAMA AND MRS. OBAMA IN TOWN HALL WITH YOUTH OF 
NORTHERN IRELAND.” Barak Obama. 17 June 2013. Provided by the US Embassy Web Site. Last Accessed 12 
Dec. 2014  
13




violent strategies even after a majority of the movement has adopted a policy of 
nonviolence and negotiation. In Chapter 1, I provide an overview of the Troubles, 
identifying events, actors, and terminology necessary to understand the case study.  
Because my later analyses center on republican paramilitar ies, I focus my narrative of 
the Troubles on major events in the nationalist and republican experience of the conflict. 
In Chapter 2, I explore existing explanations for nonstate actors’ continued use of force. 
I also outline the ways in which one can test these explanations using quantitative and 
qualitative methods. After presenting and analyzing my findings in Chapter 3, I use 
these insights in Chapter 4 to propose ways we might adjust the frameworks we use to 
understand ‘spoiler violence.’ Chapters 5 and 6 offer preliminary tests of these new 
approaches to conceptualizing ‘spoiler violence ,’ using quantitative and qualitative 
methods respectively. Finally, Chapter 7 distills my and suggests avenues of future 
research. 
Troubles Terminology 
For the sake of clarity and consistency, I now lay out some basic definitions and 
terminology that I shall utilize throughout the remainder of this study. While the term 
nationalist broadly describes anyone who supported breaking Northern Ireland’s 
constitutional link with Britain in favor of a united Ireland, republican refers to those 
individuals or organizations that advocate the use of physical force in the pursuit of this 
goal. Similarly, unionist refers to supporters of the constitutional link between Northern 
Ireland and Great Britain while loyalists are those unionists willing to resort to violence. 
It follows, therefore that all republicans or loyalists are also nationalists or unionists 
respectively, but not all nationalists or unionists are also republicans or loyalists. In 
10 
 
terms of describing these different political views and the pursuit of a certain political 
outcome, I shall use the term movement. For example, actors interested in pursuing 
independence from Great Britain would belong to the nationalist or republican 
movement, whereas actors interested in maintaining Northern Ireland’s position in the 
United Kingdom would belong to the unionist or loyalist movement. Within each 
movement, I identify paramilitaries and political parties (for example the Republican 
Movement includes both the political party of Sinn Fein and the paramilitary force of 
Provisional the Irish Republican Army). I refer to subdivisions within the paramilitary or 
political wings of each movement as factions or splinter groups. In some cases, I shall 
also discuss front groups, or pseudonyms that various paramilitaries adopt.  
Among both republicans and loyalists certain individuals actively took up arms 
and joined paramilitary units, but others endorsed armed struggle without participating 
in such activities directly. In other cases, republicans or loyalists would hold parallel 
membership in both paramilitary and political organizations. It is also worth mentioning 
that some individuals held parallel membership in both loyalist paramilitaries and state 
security forces, such as the British Army or Northern Irish police force, the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC).
14
 As reports emerged of individual members of the state security 
forces who held parallel membership in paramilitary organizations, many activists began 
alleging a system-wide policy of collusion between security forces and loyalist 
paramilitaries. Evaluating allegations of collusion and analyzing the extent to which 
security forces endorsed or turned a blind eye to such parallel membership, however, lie 
outside the purview of this study. 
                                                          
14




Because politics and religion are so tightly entwined in Northern Ireland, it is 
necessary to distinguish between religious and political forms of identity. I use the terms 
‘Catholic’ and ‘Protestant’ to refer to members of particular religious sects (Roman 
Catholic and Presbyterian, Anglican, Church of Ireland, etc. respectively). I shall use the 
terms community to refer to the social and religious context in which individuals were 
raised. In these discussions, I shall often use religious and political identifiers. For 
example, when referring to the largely Catholic, nationalist, republican population of 
Belfast’s Falls Road, I use terms such as Catholic community (raised in a Catholic 
family or with a Roman Catholic upbringing), nationalist community (raised in a family 
that supported Northern Irish autonomy and independence from Britain) , and republican 
community (raised in a family that supported secession from Great Britain and a union 
with the Republic of Ireland and, often, that advocated violent methods of change). 
Similarly, I use descriptors of Protestant (belonging to or raised in the Protestant faith), 
unionist (in favor of maintaining the constitutional link with Great Britain), and loyalist 
(unionists who advocate physical force in defense of Northern Ireland’s constitutional 
status) to describe the generally pro-British and Protestant residents of the Shankill 
Road. In select cases, I may refer to the former as CNR (Catholic/  Nationalist/ 
Republican) communities and the latter as PUL (Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist) 
communities. 
Politics in Northern Ireland, 1921-1969 
The Troubles were hardly the first time the question of British sovereignty on the 
island of Ireland had preoccupied both nonviolent and physical force activists. 
Contemporary debates over political sovereignty have their roots in the Anglo -Irish War 
12 
 
(1919-1921) and the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, which partitioned the island of 
Ireland.
15
 This treaty created a Dublin-based parliament for the twenty-six counties of 
the Irish Free State (later the Republic of Ireland) and a Belfast -based assembly for the 
six-counties of Northern Ireland. Partition satisfied neither the largely Catholic 
nationalists nor the largely Protestant unionists in the north east of the island. Figure 1.1 
illustrates the partition of Ireland into the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland.  
 
Among nationalists, the 1921 Treaty proved controversial because it granted the 
Free State dominion status rather than establishing a united and sovereign Irish republic. 
Additionally, many commentators critiqued the way the British had artificially drawn the 
borders of Northern Ireland so as to ensure that the province had a Protestant majority. 
Most notably, the Northern Irish state included only six of the traditional nine counties 
of Ulster Province. Unionists also objected to the treaty, which, while allowing the six 
                                                          
15
 While there have been many excellent accounts of the Troubles published, I recommend referencing David 
McKittrick & David McVea’s Making Sense of the Troubles: The Story of the Conflict in Northern Ireland. 
(Chicago: New Amsterdam Books, 2002) for a more detailed understanding of the conflict. 
Figure 1.1 Map of Ireland and Northern Ireland 
Free State/Republic of Ireland 
Traditional Boundaries 
of the Province of Ulster 





northeastern counties to opt out of the Free State, did initially place the counties under 
the jurisdiction of the Free State. Northern unionists viewed Britain’s apparent 
willingness to part with the six northern counties as a betrayal that  vindicated their fears 
that they would be living in a neglected outpost encircled by hostile forces.  
The semi-autonomous status of the Northern Irish state (often referred to simply 
as Ulster) reinforced this sense of abandonment and encouraged Protestant, Unionist 
politicians to adopt a series of policies preventing members of the Catholic, nationalist 
community from gaining power in Northern Ireland. These policies ranged from 
gerrymandering of voting districts to ensure a Protestant, unionist majority on local 
government councils to employment, housing, and voting restrictions designed to 
minimize the Catholic, nationalist presence in both socioeconomic and political life in 
the province. Local politicians made explicitly clear that while the Irish “boast of 
Southern Ireland being a Catholic State…we [in the North] are a Protestant Parliament 
and Protestant State.”16 Between 1921 and 1972, nationalists became increasingly vocal 
regarding “[a]ccusations of discrimination, and more general abuse of civil rights,” alleging 
four main areas of inequity: (a) housing discrimination (b) employment discrimination, 
particularly employment in the public sector (c) electoral gerrymandering and (d) the passage of 
legislation that abused civil power and created an aggressive, sectarian auxiliary police force.
17
 
                                                          
16
 Sir James Craig, Unionist Party, then Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 24 April 1934 Reported in: 
Parliamentary Debates, Northern Ireland House of Commons, Vol. XVI, Cols. 1091-95. 
17
 Graham Gudgin “Chapter 5: Discrimination in Housing and Employment under the Stormont Administration,” in 
The Northern Ireland Question: Nationalism, unionism and partition, ed. Patrick J. Roche and Brian Barton 
(Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1999). Provided by CAIN Web Service.  
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By 1968, socioeconomic inequity and inaccessible political institutions had 
created an environment ripe for protest.
18
 In many ways, the political mobilization of the 
1960s did not differ fundamentally from other social and political movements of the 
time. Adopting the strategies of Martin Luther King Junior and the American Black Civil 
Rights Movement, civil rights advocates across Northern Ireland declared “We are 
British subjects and we demand British rights."
19
 Among these demands were ‘one man – 
one job,’ ‘one man – one vote,’ and ‘one man – one house.’ From 1968-1970 civil rights 
activists focused primarily on nonviolent protests, such as rallies, marches, and sit-
downs along major roads.  
While the movement emphasized equality under law and on voting, housing, and 
employment equity, opponents, such as the Minister of Home Affairs in Northern Ireland 
criticized civil rights marches and campaigns as “[c]ommunist… anarchistic… meant to 
do away with the existence of Northern Ireland’s status.”20 Other Unionist leaders feared 
that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) had organized the civil rights protests and 
intended to use the movement as a launching pad for a renewed campaign of armed 
struggle and guerilla warfare against the British state. The protests attracted worldwide 
attention when, on 5 October 1968, members of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 
used batons and water cannons to disband a civil rights march that had been banned by 
the Northern Irish government at Stormont.  
                                                          
18
 For more details on the beginning of the Troubles please see Simon Prince’s Northern Ireland's '68: Civil Rights, 
Global Revolt and the Origins of the Troubles. (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2007). 
19
 "The 1968 Civil Rights Movement." PBS. 1998. Accessed 23 April 2015. 
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/conflict/civil.html.> 
20
 “Civil rights 'sole issue' in Northern Ireland” The Guardian (1959-2003); 5 Nov 1968; ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers: The Guardian and The Observer pg. 18 
15 
 
This event sparked a cycle of violence during which British and unionist 
politicians responded to civil rights protests with increasingly repressive measures and 
protesters from both the nationalist and unionist communities engaged in riots, sectarian 
attacks, and arson. In August of 1969, Catholic and nationalist residents of Derry city’s 
Bogside neighborhood confronted members of the RUC in a communal riot that became 
known as the Battle of the Bogside. This three-day riot and other incidences of violence 
during August of 1969 are generally considered the beginning of the Troubles and the 
shift away from civil rights activism and towards broader political change and 
insurgency. In response to these riots, British and unionist politicians introduced a 
policy of internment without trial in 1971 and deployed the British Army to enforce 
order.  
Ironically, while some civil rights activists like Bernadette Devlin had long 
framed the campaign as a struggle for not only civil rights but also for broader political 
reform, declaring that “[w]e are fighting for a socialist republic of Ireland…an Irish 
workers and farmers republic,” initially, the civil rights movement had self-consciously 
attempted to distance itself from issues of Irish nationalism in an effort to build a cross-
community base of support.
21
 In fact, Ivan Cooper, one of the leaders of the 1972 anti-
internment march that ended in the infamous Bloody Sunday incident in which British 
paratroopers shot 26 unarmed civilian protesters, killing 13 immediately, was a 
nationalist politician from a working-class Protestant background and staunch advocate 
of nonviolence.  
                                                          
21
 Bernadette Likens Civil Rights Fight Here to Irish Struggle Goodyear, Sara Jane;Crews, Stephen Chicago Tribune 
(1963-Current file); 31 Aug 1969; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune pg. 2 
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The civil rights movement originally had united Irish republicans from both the 
IRA and the older nationalist organizations known as Wolfe Tone societies; communists; 
socialists; and members of trade unions, the Labour party, housing associations, and 
even the Young Unionists of Queen’s University.22 It was not until the highly publicized 
violence of 1969 and the repressive measures with which the British state responded to 
community riots and protests that the rhetoric of opposing the British state and 
establishing zones of Irish sovereignty began entering public discourse.  
Troubles-Related Violence: 1970-1979 
The Troubles of Northern Ireland are best understood as a multilayered network 
of conflicts: violence emerged at the national, political level as militant nationalists and 
unionists clashed over the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, at the socio-
communal level as religious and cultural identity groups battled over issues of 
belonging, at the neighborhood level, in which paramilitaries competed amongst 
themselves for dominance in different regions, and at the international level, as Irish 
nationalists attempted to exploit the coercive, compellant nature of violence so that the 
British government would withdraw from Northern Ireland.  Broadly speaking, however, 
the conflict of 1969-1998  involved three primary actors: Northern Ireland’s majority 
Catholic proponents of a united Ireland free from British Rule (nationalists); its majority 
Protestant advocates of maintaining Northern Ireland’s constitutional link with Great 
Britain (unionists); and agents of the British State, such as the police force, the army, 
and British government officials.  
                                                          
22
 Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association "‘We Shall Overcome’ The History of the Struggle for Civil Rights in 
Northern Ireland 1968 – 1978” (1978) Provided by CAIN Web Service 
17 
 
While the 1970s proved to be the bloodiest years of the Troubles, throughout the 
first ten years of the conflict, British and nationalist leaders attempted to negotiate 
ceasefires and power-sharing agreements. In fact, during this period, Northern Ireland 
Secretary Merlyn Rees “legalized both Sinn Fein...and the UVF, partly to facilitate the 
business of talking to them,” informal talks produced no actionable policy options.23 
Simultaneously, however, loyalist and republican leaders refused to communicate 
directly and continued pursuing campaigns of both cross-movement and intra-movement 
violence within the contexts of tit-for-tat killings and factional feuds. Efforts to 
negotiate compromises and settlements continually failed in the face of both nationalist 
and unionist protest and, by 1976, British politicians were in “a double bind…the 
problem was what political policy the government might pursue if both powersharing 
and majority rule were non-starters. Its answer was to move away from the idea of 
finding political agreement and to concentrate instead on the security and economic 
fields.”24  
Rory Mason, who replaced Rees as Northern Ireland Secretary in 1976, “made it 
clear he was in the more straightforward business of defeating the IRA…[and] that the 
days of political initiatives…were over.”25 The prior year the IRA had broadened its 
definition of legitimate targets to include not only recruited security forces but also 
business figures who were “attempting to stabilize the economy and were therefore ‘part 
of the Brritish war machine,’” prison guards, and off-duty officers.26 In 1977, young 
republicans (including Gerry Adams), who had been interned in the early 1970s were 
                                                          
23
 McKittrick & McVea, 109 
24
 Ibid., 114 
25
 Ibid., 199 
26
 Ibid., 128 
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released from jail, and with this new leadership, the republican movement began to 
reorganize its military apparatus and to develop a more coherent political agenda. For 
many republicans, their time in prison was the first chance they had to think about 
political theory and strategies beyond retaliatory attacks. It is possible that political 
overtures like those that had been made in the early 1970s may have been more 
successful after the republican movement had time to develop a cohesive agenda, but the 
failure of prior political initiatives had convinced Mason that the only way to promote 
security was to defeat the IRA militarily. The late 1970s and early 1980s, therefore, 
were characterized by a virtual absence of political negotiation or dialogue other than 
the 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement, which was soundly rejected by both unionists and 
republicans. The British government also tightened security measures across Northern 
Ireland, removing the ‘special category status’ that had previously recognized republican 
and loyalist prisoners as prisoners of war rather than common criminals in 1976.  
The Armalite and the Ballot Box: 1980-1993 
The republican movement did, however, begin to adopt alternative methods of 
political protest leading into the 1980s. From 1976 to 1981, republican prisoners had 
engaged in a ‘blanket’ protest, wearing cell blankets in lieu of prison uniforms, and a 
‘dirty’ protest during which they refused to bathe and smeared excrement across the 
walls of their cells to protest the removal of special category status. The IRA also ended 
attacks against prison officers in 1980. The ‘political status’ protest reached its peak in 
1981 when republican prisoners launched their second hunger strike against orders from 
the outside republican leadership. Unlike the first hunger strike in 1979, prisoners, 
19 
 
starting with Bobby Sands, joined the strike on a staggered schedule and remained on 
strike until ten men had starved themselves to death.  
The 1981 hunger strikes proved controversial both within and outside of the 
republican movement. Then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, staunchly refused to 
negotiate with the republican prisoners, famously no ting that “[t]here will be no political 
status. Crime is crime is crime. It is not political. It is crime and there can be no question 
of granting political status.”27 Simultaneously, the hunger strikers clashed with IRA 
leaders outside of the prison, who “felt the hunger strikes represented a serious diversion 
of resources of all kinds from their main campaign of violence.”28 The IRA finally 
agreed to support the strikes when Bobby Sands and other hunger strikers ran for and 
won seats in Westminster prior to their deaths. After witnessing the hunger strikers 
electoral success, Adams and other republican leaders began advocating for an ‘armalite 
and the ballot box’ strategy under which the IRA would pursue simultaneous electoral 
and military campaigns. In 1982, the IRA also accelerated its international campaign, 
receiving a large shipment of arms from Libya and launching an intensive bombing 
campaign in England. In the process, they further expanded their definition of legitimate 
targets, attacking both civilian and military targets in an effort to export the fear and 
uncertainty of the Troubles to England.  
Interestingly, while the IRA refined its political agenda during the 1980s, the 
rival Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) “denigrated over the years into a collection 
of local gangs often dominated by personalities who had parted company from the IRA, 
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usually because they were considered too erratic.”29 Throughout the 1980s, the INLA 
became mired in internal feuds between the Belfast and Dublin brigades and between the 
INLA and a breakaway organization the IPLO, which was known for directed a large 
portion of its violence against other republicans. Conflict and feuds within the INLA and 
IPLO continued into the 1990s. In fact, in 1992, the IRA intervened in an internal IPLO 
feud, forcing both factions’ disbandment. 
The Northern Ireland Peace Process 1993-1998 
In 1993, it became public that Gerry Adams and nonviolent Social Democratic 
and Labour Party (SDLP) leader John Hume had been engaged in preliminary 
discussions about how they might reach a political settlement. These Hume-Adams talks 
are commonly cited as the early stages of the 1990s peace process. The following year, 
the IRA (although not the INLA) and a majority of loyalist paramilitaries agreed to 
ceasefires in hopes of facilitating exploratory talks between the British government and 
the republican movement as well as between loyalists and the British government.  
Negotiations remained tense as the British government demanded the IRA provide 
guarantees that it would not resume violent action. The IRA broke its ceasefire in 1996 
with the bombing of Canary Warf. In the same year, the INLA fell victim to yet another 
internal feud, and continued violence on the part of loyalists caused many politicians to 
question whether they could legitimately claim the loyalist paramilitaries remained on 
ceasefire. Despite such setbacks, in 1998, the Good Friday Agreement passed by 
referendum with approximately a 72% vote of support in Northern Ireland. When 
examining the voting patterns among unionists and nationalists, “best estimates 
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indicated that the over-whelming majority of Catholics / Nationalists voted 'Yes' perhaps 
as many as 96 or 97 per cent. In the case of Protestants / Unionists who voted 'yes' it is 
estimated that the figure was between 51 and 53 per cent.”30  
Since 1998, Northern Ireland has witness the successful incorporation of many 
former IRA members into the Northern Irish government, including the appointment of 
Martin McGuiness as Deputy First Minister and then First Minister. As Northern Irish 
politics become increasingly normalized, remaining paramilitaries like the rIRA, 
Continuity IRA (CIRA), and Óglaigh na hÉireann (ONH)  are generally categorized as, 
in the words of Dr. John Horgan ‘violent dissident republicans’  (VDR) and criticized as 
criminal or terrorist organizations set on undermining the peace process. It is  with these 
claims that the current study is concerned. 
Understanding Northern Ireland’s Paramilitaries  
Longtime Troubles journalist, Peter Taylor notes that, when discussing 
paramilitaries from between 1970 and 1998, “there are two popular misconceptions … 
First, that all were mindless thugs devoid of any political motivation … [second] that the 
conflict is about religion.”31  It is undeniably that, many paramilitaries engaged in a 
certain degree of criminal activity as a source of financing (most notab ly bank robberies 
and the drug trade), meaning that individual members often straddled the line between 
politically motivated militant and common criminal. Taylor observes, however, that, 
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despite these activities, paramilitary organizations of the Troubles were first and 
foremost armed insurgent groups with distinct political goals.  
As Peter Taylor also emphasizes, sectarianism and religion certainly have shaped 
politics in Northern Ireland; however it would be a misrepresenta tion of the conflict to 
define the Troubles as an issue of religion. The Troubles were thirty-years of conflict 
over Northern Ireland’s political status. When developing typologies of political 
violence, it is important to distinguish between the sectarian behavior and attitudes of 
particular individuals within paramilitaries and the political, ideological goals uniting 
members of paramilitary organizations. Based on this nuance, I examine the context 
shaping paramilitary behavior on three levels: movement-wide concerns shared by 
republicans or unionists as a whole during a given political moment; factional matters of 
inter-group hostilities or alliances within the republican movement or the loyalist 
movement; and parochial issues such as contests over leadership or other intra-group 
conflicts. 
In many cases, due to the clandestine nature of these organizations, it is difficult 
to obtain reliable information about paramilitaries’ exact origins. Broadly speaking, 
however, it is possible to think in terms of five main paramilitaries. The loyalists had the 
Ulster Defense Association and the smaller Ulster Volunteer Force. Republicans joined 
the Provisional IRA, the dominant republican paramilitary throughout the Troubles,  the 
Official IRA, or the Irish National Liberation Army. Most paramilitary violence during 
the Troubles can be attributed to one of these five organizations or their splinter groups. 
Figures 1.2 outlines the genealogy of the primary republican paramilitaries that were 
active during the Troubles and that appear throughout this study.  
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 For the remainder of this paper, I use the case of Northern Ireland’s peace process to test 
existing explanations for why some armed nonstate groups use violence even after the 
mainstream movement enters into political negotiations. As a cursory history of the Troubles 
shows, the Irish republican movement has been notoriously prone to splits and internal divisions. 
In many way, British allegations that these paramilitaries were criminals and that the conflict in 
Northern Ireland was first and foremost a security rather than a political issue mirror many 
contemporary debates over how to understand and address modern-day paramilitaries. I hope the 
long, well-documented history of republican paramilitaries in Northern Ireland will shed light 
not only on similarities and differences within the conflict but also on ways in which case studies 
like this one can contribute to more general discussions of how nonstate actors use force.  
It is only by gaining a better understanding of the nonstate actors strategizing and tactics 
that we can improve strategies of counterinsurgency and peacebuilding. In the next chapter, I 
explore the primary ways in which political scientists tend to understand the ongoing use of 
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violence by nonstate actors. After dissecting these explanations, I outline several ways through 
which I might test the validity of each theory. 
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CHAPTER 2: Theorizing Political Violence 
Often, even once mainstream elements of a movement have agreed to adopt 
strictly constitutional and nonviolent methods of protest and political change, certain 
nonstate actors continue to perpetrate political violence. Political science literature tends 
to assume that these actors either do not trust negotiators’ credibility or do not want 
peace. While a number of studies make this claim, to date there have been no attempts to 
systematically prove this assumption. I aim to address this gap in the literature with a 
preliminary mixed-methods study.  In this chapter I explore the two primary ways 
political scientists understand the use of political violence after the introduction of a 
peace process. I introduce two hypotheses that summarize the main points of each 
argument. After comparing and contrasting these explanations, I highlight pertinent 
critiques of the theories. Finally, I explain my research design and outline the ways in 
which I will test each hypothesis. 
The Ethnic Security Dilemma 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Hain, summarized his interpretation 
of the ‘lessons of the Northern Ireland Peace Process’, stating that: 
What is so destructive in terrorism is not just the wrecking of lives but the 
impact on the psychology of a community. Above all it obscures the natural 
desire of the majority for peace by entrenching bitterness and creating an entirely  
understandable hysteria in which voices of moderation can no longer be heard. It 
is desperately hard for people to focus on politics when they are under attack.
33
  
Such arguments that, during peace negotiations, ‘militant’ voices drown out those of 
their moderate counterparts by creating mistrust, uncertainty, and insecurity echo 
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defensive realist theories of the security dilemma.
34
 Barry Posen applied the logic of the 
security dilemma to ethno-nationalist conflicts when he explained how, after the collapse 
of governance structures, uncertainty and mistrust create a situation in which actors are 
“more likely to assume their neighbours are dangerous than not.” 35 Paul Roe complicates 
Posen’s argument, noting that since ethno-politics involve ‘societal security’ rather than 
sovereign security, the dynamics of the security dilemma at the intrastate level “are far 
more specific and contextual than those relating to the state.”36 Because conditions under 
which a group possesses societal security are less clearly defined than those under which 
a state possesses sovereign security, threat assessment in ethno-national conflicts 
becomes exponentially more challenging, thereby escalating the level of insecurity and 
uncertainty involved in ensuring one’s own security.  
It makes sense, therefore, that one might expect to see the security dilemma 
heavily influence actors in the Northern Ireland conflict where combatants employed 
force in defense of not only societal, ethno-national security but also territorial, 
sovereign security. When participants or observers question negotiators’ credibility, 
uncertainty and mistrust fuel fears about losing influence during political negotiations or 
losing relevance in a post-conflict society. Credibility challenges thus encourage actors 
to continue engaging in violence. 
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Security dilemma explanations for continued political violence conceptualize 
militant activity after the introduction of a peace process as an unintentional product of 
uncertainty and mistrust. By this logic, a return to violence represents what Roe calls ‘a 
tragedy’ born out of misunderstanding and miscommunication. Stephen John Stedman, 
however, offers a more malevolent interpretation of militant actors by describing 
‘spoilers,’ or “leaders and parties who  believe that peace emerging from negotiations 
threatens their power, world view, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts 
to achieve it.”37 According to Stedman’s theory, it was no mere accident that the Omagh 
bomb “[put] increasing pressure on an already fragile assembly…the troublesome 
divisions between unionists in favour of the Good Friday Agreement and those against it 
[were] ever wider.”38 Rather, militants of the rIRA consciously used the Omagh bomb to 
protest peace negotiations and to sow fear throughout the public.  
Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter expand on Stedman’s theory, arguing that 
spoilers undermine peace by exploiting actors’ mistrust of each other and of the 
government with which they are negotiating.
39
 The events of 15 August 1998 also appear 
to vindicate this theory. The Omagh bomb escalated the risks both of a loyalist 
retaliatory attack and, consequently, of breaking the paramilitary ceasefires; thus the 
attack jeopardized the ability of British, loyalist, and republican leaders to negotiate 
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peace. Theories of “spoiling behavior,” therefore, differ from a security dilemma 
explanation in that events like Omagh are born not out of a crisis of credibility but rather 
because organizations like the rIRA believe negotiations represent a betrayal of ideals 
and/or that peace threatens their organizational interests. Both theories, however, 
envision ongoing political violence as the product of some contest between moderate 
elements willing to pursue peace negotiations and hardline militants who oppose such 
political engagement. 
Comparing Explanations of ‘Spoiler’ Violence  
Based on the writings of Posen, Roe, Stedman, and Walter and Kydd, it is possible to 
produce two hypotheses explaining why paramilitaries continue campaigns of armed struggle 
into periods of ceasefire and political negotiation. While this phenomenon is commonly referred 
to as ‘spoiler’ violence, for the sake of clarity, I will use the term continued political violence 
(CPV) to differentiate between the Stedman-style theory of spoiling behavior and the observation 
that nonstate actors continue to use violent means of political protest and change rather than 
enter negotiations or adopt constitutional and nonviolent methods.   
H1: (Security Dilemma) Crises of credibility prevent actors from trusting each 
other; therefore prolonging and reinforcing cycles of violence. 
H2: (Spoiling Behavior)  Actors oppose and attempt to undermine peace in 
order to protect their own ideological or organizational interests. 
Under both H1 and H2, peace processes divide those within a movement who are willing to 
compromise and negotiate (moderates) from their hardline advocates of physical force and 
ideological purity (militants). Existing literature documents in great detail the methods by 
which, “under certain circumstances, the opening up of political space may result in 
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additional channels through which violence can be instigated and organized.”40 
According to Stedman, Posen, Roe, and Walter and Kydd, one of these additi onal 
channels that peace processes open is the formation of violent splinter groups. As 
moderate and militant elements within a movement clash over the peace process, factions 
organize around these differences. While H1 and H2 do not reject the notion that factionalization 
occurs outside periods of political negotiation, they do imply that once a peace process is 
introduced, the process’ perceived legitimacy becomes the determinant of whether organizations 
use violent or nonviolent strategies.  
While both hypotheses predict continued violence if certain elements within a 
movement believe that the costs of negotiating and accepting a political settlement 
outweigh the potential benefits, H1 and H2 offer different explanations for why and how 
some elements of a movement choose to employ violence when others pursue political 
negotiations and nonviolent avenues of political change. Under H1, a crisis of credibility drives 
the factionalization, while a desire to undermine the peace process compels actors to use 
violence according to H2.   
Critiquing the Moderate Militant Divide 
 Conventional logic holds that a faction’s opinion of a proposed settlement will 
determine whether the faction participates in a peace process or engages in CPV. 
Presumably, groups that are pro-peace will participate in negotiations while militant, 
‘anti-peace process’ elements will turn to CPV. Hardline militants may attempt to use 
violence to undermine this burgeoning peace or because they do not trust the moderate 
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leaders to negotiate a fair settlement. Most scholars use these dynamics to explain events 
like the formation of the rIRA in 1997 by former members of the PIRA. The problem 
with such explanations lies in the fact that they assume the introduction of a peace 
process fundamentally changes actors’ decision-making processes. With the initiation of 
a peace process, a factions’ attitude towards the peace proposal  becomes the primary 
factor shaping actors’ strategies and tactics.  
Under H1 and H2, violence outside of a period of political negotiation involves a 
multitude of long and short term strategies, tactics, and objectives. During periods of 
negotiation, however, H1 and H2 offer reductionist explanations for violence that 
emphasize a moderate-militant divide. By focusing only on disagreements relating to the 
peace process, H1 and H2 ignore other potential sources of division within a movement, 
such as resource allocation, local power struggles, and other parochial interests.  In the  
remainder of this study, I use the case of Northern Ireland’s 1990s peace process to test 
whether one can find quantitative and qualitative evidence consistent with the claim that 
peace processes alter the way armed nonstate actors think about and deploy force. 
Research Design 
My study includes both quantitative and qualitative analyses. The quantitative 
analysis of Troubles-related political violence uses incidences of terrorism associated 
with the Troubles from 1970 through 2013 and Troubles-related fatalities between 1969 
and 2003, as included in Michael McKeown’s database of deaths and Malcom Sutton’s 
Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland . The qualitative analysis utilizes secondary 
31 
 
source research and first-hand interviews with former paramilitaries, Northern Irish 
researchers and community workers.
41
  
Different patterns of violence are consistent with different explanations for CPV. 
In the quantitative portion of my study, I examine the spatial distribution of and trends 
evident in violence by armed nonstate actors, particularly following the Good Friday 
Agreement of 1998. Because H1 and H2 each emphasizes different causal mechanisms 
behind continued violence, it is possible to identify types of violence that is more 
consistent with one hypothesis than the other.  
According to H1, post-peace process violence will be reactionary and/or defensive, 
reflecting a sense of mistrust among actors. Intra-movement violence will spike as 
factions target leaders and groups they consider dangerous or untrustworthy. Factions 
opposed to a peace process will accept the idea that compromise is, theoretically, 
necessary but will mistrust the conditions under which a peace process has been 
proposed or the leaders involved in negotiations. Divisions within and among factions 
will generally reflect different degrees of confidence in the credibility and reliability of 
political actors advocating the peace process.  
Under H2, “rogue” or “fringe” actors will use violence to create uncertainty, fear, 
and mistrust or to demonstrate that political negotiations will not bring security. 
Factions will organize around those who consider compromise strategic and those who 
consider negotiation a form of surrender. These intransigent militants will demand that 
negotiations happen on their own terms and oppose making concessions not because they 
                                                          
41
 Michael McKeown. (2009). Spreadsheet of Deaths Associated with Violence in Northern Ireland, 1969-2001, 
(Version 1.1; dated 4 Feb 2013), Microsoft Excel Spreadsheet; 1296KB]. Provided by CAIN Web Service. 
32 
 
mistrust their negotiating partners but rather because such concessions violate their 
principles.  
Using these trends, I generated three questions for which I expect each hypothesi s 
to predict different outcomes. 
1) What types of violence characterize peace processes and how does this differ from 
periods outside of a peace process? Following the introduction of a peace process, does 
one observe statistically significant changes in the targets, weapons used in an attack, and 
groups responsible for (a) fatalities (b) incidents of political violence? If not, when does 
one observe statistically significant changes? 
2) When does one observe statistically significant spikes in violence between 
subgroups within the same coalition, or intra-movement violence (IMV), and 
what forms of IMV is most dominant (faction 1 versus faction 2, infighting within 
a faction)? Does one observe different clusters of intra-factional as opposed to 
inter-factional violence? 
3) How does the spatial distribution of violence relate, if at all, to the spatial 
distribution of paramilitary strongholds? 
I then use H1 and H2 to predict the forms and patterns of violence I would expect to see 
if each hypothesis holds true.  
Regarding Question 1 (types of violence one sees during peace processes), 
evidence consistent with H1 would include ‘militant’ or ‘hardline’ groups bearing 
primary responsibility for violence and fatalities; fatalities would be low, reflecting the 
defensive nature of militant campaigns. I would also expect the types of attacks and 
weapons utilized to be oriented towards defensive military action. Levels of cross-
cutting violence (violence involving at least one republican faction and at least one 
loyalist faction, in which loyalists only collaborate with loyalists and republicans only 
collaborate with republicans) would remain consistent. Evidence consistent with H2 
would include anti-negotiation ‘militants’ launching attacks designed to undermine 
peace talk, such as targeting leaders willing to compromise or using lethal, 
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indiscriminate attacks to create fear and to turn the population against negotiations. Both 
cross-cutting (republican versus loyalist) and intra-movement (loyalist versus loyalist or 
republican vs republican) violence might spike as a consequence. 
 In terms of Question 2 (forms of IMV), for evidence to be consistent with H1, I 
would expect to see a spike in IMV following introduction of a peace process or 
ceasefire. Violence would be primarily inter-factional. Intra-factional violence would 
precede the formation of a breakaway group of militant hardliners wary of electoral 
strategies of political change. Conversely, if I see patterns of IMV in which IMV 
precedes the formation of a breakaway group of militant hardliners opposed to 
negotiations, this evidence would be consistent with H2. 
 Regarding Question 3 (the spatial distribution of paramilitary activity), both H1 
and H2 would predict new loci of intra-movement violence to emerge as new factions 
organize in opposition or support of the peace process. If H1 is correct, closer 
investigation of these new centers of IMV should reveal that they cluster in areas with 
diverse views towards the specific circumstances of the current peace process. H2, in 
contrast, would predict that residents of these areas hold more immutable opinions 
towards negotiations as a whole.  
I also supplement this spatial analysis by comparing my own analyses of violence during 
the 1990s and beyond with previous studies of violence throughout the conflict. While 
McKeown’s dataset includes more details about types of attacks, making it better for running 
descriptive statistics and making graphs, the summary data in Sutton’s index allows me to 
geocode the approximate address at which the death took place. Using this geocoded data, I have 
constructed GIS maps showing the distribution of Troubles-Related fatalities between 1994 and 
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2001 across the Belfast urban area. I compare my results to a similar GIS mapping project 
undertaken by Shirlow, et al., in which a team plotted fatalities in different postal code regions.  
Conclusion 
I use the case of paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland during the peace process of the 
1990s to the two most common ways in which political scientists explain CPV. H1 and H2 
conceptualize CPV as a fundamentally different type of violence from violence during 
other stages of a conflict. While both security dilemma and spoiling behavior 
explanations remain the dominant frameworks through which political  scientists 
understand CPV, both hypotheses rest upon two central assumptions: (a) that violent 
splinter groups emerge when debate over the adoption of nonviolent strategies and 
engagement with a proposed peace process divide moderates and militants and (b ) that 
because CPV reflect armed groups’ mistrust or rejection of the peace process, 
introducing a period of political negotiation alters the way nonstate actors think about 
and deploy force. In Chapter 3, I perform a quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
political violence during Northern Ireland’s Troubles. In doing so I seek to test whether 
the actual patterns and experiences I document align with the predictions that logically 
follow from H1 and H2. 
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CHAPTER 3: Empirical Analysis 
 This chapter outlines and analyzes my quantitative and qualitative findings regarding 
CPV in Northern Ireland. Due to the accessibility of data and community members’ willingness 
to discuss the Troubles with me, I focus this analysis on the period of time commonly referred to 
as Northern Ireland’s current peace process (1994-1998) and perform a more detailed, micro-
level analysis of republican paramilitary activity only.  
The Data 
In my empirical analysis, I examine two types of data: Troubles-related fatalities and 
incidences of terrorism from 1970 through 2013. When studying Troubles-related fatalities, I use 
two different databases of deaths: Malcom Sutton’s Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland, 
1969-2001 and Michael McKeown’s Database of Deaths, 1969-2003.42 I use terrorist incidents 
as reported in the 2014 Global Terrorism Database (GTD). Sutton’s database records 3,531 
deaths while McKeown’s includes 3,649. Both deaths databases include information on the date, 
responsible party, victim’s name, sex, and communal or political, and basic details of the death. 
McKeown’s database also notes the context of fatalities, such as occasions when fatalities were 
the result of factionalism, counterinsurgency, sectarian attacks, or punitive actions. The GTD in 
turn contains 4,613 Troubles-related incidents and over 130 variables. I focused my analysis 
mostly on the descriptions of attack type, attack subtype, target type, target subtype, and group 
responsible. 
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Within the purview of the current study I apply the following limitations : First, I 
use a subset of my data that includes only violence following the second IRA ceasefire 
of 1996. Ideally, my data would include the lead-up to ceasefires to account for 
negotiations outside of the official peace process; however the GTD is missing data from 
1993, making it difficult to perform a reliable analysis of the period directly preceding 
the ceasefires. Another limitation to the data lies in the fact that the GDT only includes 
approximate spatial data (ie., Belfast versus Derry City). In order to study the local 
patterns and spatial distribution of violence, I needed to be able to cross reference data 
with newspapers and other media sources to find street names and more specific 
locational data.  
Unfortunately, the GTD only includes enough citations and summary information 
to facilitate this cross referencing for events beginning in 1996. Even by limiting by data 
to the year 1996 and later, some entries still did not have enough identifying information 
and, therefore, could not be included in my spatial analysis.  This analysis only considers 
terrorist incidents for which a particular organization has claimed credit or for which a loyalist or 
republican group is generally considered responsible. Because incidences of terrorism appear to 
serve as a better indicator of armed nonstate actors’ behavior than fatality counts, I have also 
constructed GIS maps of terrorist attacks in the Belfast Urban Area, using the GTD. For these 
maps, I use a subset of the GTD that includes 115 incidences of terrorism.   
While, ideally, my data on paramilitary strongholds would include all of Northern 
Ireland and pertinent regions in the Republic of Ireland, for the purposes of this study I 
have limited my dataset to the capital city of Northern Ireland. I am able to use Belfast 
as a microcosm in which to study paramilitary activity because spatial analyses of social, 
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religious, and violent trends reveal that “Belfast illustrates much of the division and 
interdependence that has taken place in Ireland over the last two centuries…complex spatio-
religious patterns…resulted in the city being the focus of much of the violence during the 
Troubles.”43 Similarly, while a full investigation of paramilitary act ivity during ceasefires 
and peace processes would include a qualitative study of these events and of the political 
contexts in which they occurred, I focus my qualitative analysis on the case study of the 
rIRA. I then corroborate my interpretation of the data using interview and secondary source 
material. 
Coding Paramilitary Fatalities 
I code targets of political violence based on the relationship between the party 
responsible for the death and the victim of each incident.
44
 I examine responsible parties and 
targets in terms of both their communal (socio-religious) identities and their organizational 
affiliations (involvement in or association with various military or paramilitary groups). 
Communal identity requires only two levels of analysis (PUL vs CNR, and then within each 
category, Protestant, Unionist, and/or Loyalist and Catholic, Nationalist, and/or Republican 
respectively). I have divided organizational identities into subgroups at three to four levels, 
depending on the complexity of actors’ organizational affiliations. For organizational identities, I 
distinguish between combatants (paramilitaries, state security forces/army) and noncombatants 
(politically involved vs. politically uninvolved). I then identify politically involved 
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noncombatants as civilian political activists, informers, or alleged informers. Similarly, among 
the combatants, I distinguish between paramilitaries (loyalist vs. republican) and security forces 
(state vs. local). Based on this coding scheme, I can, for example, differentiate between cases in 
which a member of the republican paramilitary the Irish National Liberation Army killed another 
member of the INLA and a case in which this INLA paramilitary killed a Catholic civilian 
without any political affiliation. Such distinctions matter when attempting to understand 
paramilitary strategy. Variations in targets often reflect shifting goals and objectives. 
Such distinctions also matter because scholars continue to debate the degree to 
which local Northern Irish police and security forces were infiltrated by members of 
paramilitaries or behaved in ways similar to a paramilitary organization. Given that my 
study is concerned with the actions of paramilitary organizations rather than security 
forces, I consider such extensions Northern Ireland’s security apparatus as analytically 
distinct from paramilitary, insurgent forces of the republican and loyalist movements. I 
do, however, distinguish between paramilitary violence against state security forces (like 
the British Army) and local security institutions to account for cases in which 
paramilitaries interacted with members of local security forces on the basis of their 
personal, neighborhood identities and connections rather than on the basis of their work 
as an agent or representative of the state.  
In the case that an individual is believed to have been both a member of the security 
forces and a paramilitary organization, I have prioritized the paramilitary identity due to my 
interest in understanding patterns of paramilitary violence and in an attempt to account for 
allegations of collusion between paramilitaries and members of the state security services. While 
this system remains imperfect, the inclusion of coding based on communal identity serves as a 
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robustness check. This communal identity coding considers the possibility that an individual’s 
identity as a member of the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist or Catholic/Republican/Nationalist 
community took precedence over the individual’s identity as a representative of the state.  
Using these actor characterizations, I identify two kinds of violence: internal (in which 
victim and perpetrator were from the same ethno-national community or movement) and cross-
cutting (cases in which violence occurs between members of at least two different organizations 
or communities). Within the category of cross-cutting violence, I disaggregate my data to include 
inter-paramilitary incidents (what all parties to violence are members of paramilitary 
organizations), security incidents (situations in which one or more party represent the state, for 
example a prison officer, member of the police service, or an affiliate of the British Army) and 
civilian incidents (in which one or more parties had no known paramilitary or military affiliation 
and was, by all accounts, a noncombatant).  Consequently, an example of my final coding for 
fatalities would be ‘the death of a member of the republican IRA at the hands of a fellow IRA 
member; a result of intra-factional, intra-movement violence.’ 
Fatality Data Analysis and Limitations 
In analyzing data on Troubles-related fatalities, I found that between 1991 and 1995, sub-




This represents a statistically significant growth when compared with the 1986 through 1990 
average of 42.10%.
45
 Likewise, the complementary decline in the proportion of state-targets 
between the periods of 1986-1990 and 1991-1995 also proves statistically significant. These 
patterns suggest a decisive shift towards nonmilitary targets (civilians, paramilitaries, etc.) and 
away from security targets (police, army, etc.) in the lead-up to the paramilitary ceasefires. 
Within these sub-state targets, however, there is no statistically significant change in the number 
of fatalities on account of factionalism.  
Advocates of security dilemma theories (H1) and spoiler behavior explanations (H2) 
emphasize the growing tension between moderates and militants and argue that events like the 
paramilitary ceasefires of 1994 signal the dominance of moderate, constitutional and electoral 
strategies of enacting political change over the use of armed struggle. H1 and H2 both predict a 
growth in factionalism following the introduction of a peace process or ceasefire as violent 
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Figure 3.1: Data from McKeown’s Database of Deaths 
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splinter groups form and moderates and militants clash. Data on Troubles-related fatalities, 
however, suggests only that civilian and paramilitary fatalities grew leading up to the 1994 
ceasefires not that fatalities resulting from factionalism increased. Such evidence is consistent 
with neither H1 nor H2. 
The average number of fatalities from cross-cutting violence (PUL vs CNR or CNR vs. 
PUL violence) declined significantly between the time periods of 1984-1993 and 1994-2003; but 
this change was not accompanied by any statistically significant change in fatalities resulting 
from only intra-communal/intra-movement violence (IMV). Figure 3.2 graphs fatalities 
attributable to republican paramilitaries in terms of those that involved cross-cutting violence 
(republican paramilitaries killing someone outside of the CNR community) and that involved 






















































































































Troubles Related Fatalites Attributable to Republican Paramilitaries, 
1965-2003 
Cross Cutting Violence Intra-Communal/Intra-Movement Violence
Figure 3.2: Data from McKeown’s Database of Deaths 
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H1 and H2 predict that IMV will spike following the introduction of a peace process because, 
when actors believe a political settlement threatens their interests, militant elements may attempt 
to use violence to destabilize negotiations.
46
 Data on fatalities from IMV around the ceasefires of 
1994 and the signing of the GFA in 1998, however, provides no evidence consistent with either 
H1 or H2. In fact, the frequency of fatalities from IMV has remained relatively consistent since 
the early 1990s. IMV fatalities started declining in 1999 after the signing of the GFA; however 
the difference between average number of fatalities from IMV over these five years and the 
average during the five years preceding 1999 is not statistically significant. Rather, the data 
suggests that IMV was a constant feature of violence in Northern Ireland both within and outside 
of periods of political negotiation. 
The spatial distribution of fatalities also remains consistent before and after the Good 
Friday Peace Agreement. H1 and H2 suggest that the introduction of a peace process shifts the 
way nonstate actors decide whether to use violent versus nonviolent strategies. They argue that 
after a peace process begins, actors predicate their use of violence on their acceptance or 
rejection of the peace process. Based on this logic, one would expect pre-ceasefire violence to 
follow a different spatial pattern from post-ceasefire violence, as militants shift their attention 
towards protesting or disrupting the burgeoning peace process. Mapping fatalities after 1994 
reveals that most CNR and PUL fatalities occurred within their respective communities (see 
Figure 3.3).  
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Spatially, these post-ceasefire deaths appear consistent with their pre-ceasefire predecessors, 
again challenging the assumption of H1 and H2 that armed nonstate actors think about and 
deploy violence differently before and after the initiation of a peace process. Mesev et. al noted 
that, within the Belfast urban area,  “[v]ictims with loyalist or republican affiliations tended to be 
located in highly segregated Protestant and Catholic areas respectively. In terms of the British 
Army/RUC victims, deaths tended to occur in highly segregated Catholic areas because [British 
Army/RUC officers] were more likely to be assigned to keep the peace in those places and were 
targets for Republican paramilitary offenses.”47  
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One observes further consistency between pre and post-GFA Northern Ireland when 
examining the distribution of fatalites in relation to areas of high deprivation. Fay et. al found 
that  
[t]he distribution of deaths in the Troubles was correlated with the Robson deprivation 
indicator, and whilst the wards with the highest death rates also score high on the Robson 
index, no overall statistical association between death rate and deprivation; however, 
when the number of civilian deaths per ward was used, the correlation between deaths 
and deprivation scores just about reaches significance (.501), and it is clear that wards 




As Figure 3.4 shows, Troubles-related fatalities continued to cluster in areas with high levels of 
deprivation after the 1994 ceasefires.  
 
 
Of the 75 deaths that occurred between 1994 and 2001, only 11 of these fatalities took place 
outside of one of the 15 Belfast Neighborhoods recommended as Neighborhood Renewal Areas 
(NRA) in June 2003. The Northern Irish Department for Social Development notes that NRAs 
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are “neighbourhoods in the most deprived 10% of wards across Northern Ireland…identified 
using the Noble Multiple Deprivation Measure.”49 Both fatalities and terrorist attacks tend to 
cluster in areas considered to be within the top 10% of the most deprived wards in Northern 
Ireland. Such consistency in terms of the spatial distribution of pre and post ceasefire violence 
challenges the notion that ceasefires and peace processes fundamentally change armed nonstate 
actors’ use of force. Studying correlations between economic deprivation and violence can also 
help scholars refine our understanding of the relationship among socioeconomic deprivation, 
crime, and dissident politics. Unfortunately, until data collectors adopt more systematic ways of 
measuring political violence, spatial analyses will prove only as useful as the most reliable 
dataset from which they are constructed. Later I propose some preliminary ways of improving 
data collection; however this is a topic that requires more extensive study than my cursory 
exploration permits and, consequently, lies outside the purview of this paper. Examining 
fatalities provides only a partial image of the levels of violence occurring within movements 
because such data only captures violence that ended in death. Using terrorist attacks rather than 
fatalities as an indicator of IMV offers a more accurate measure of overall levels of violence by 
including cases of non-lethal violence and provides a context in which to consider fatality data. 
Terrorist Incidences Coding 
 When coding incidences of terrorism as opposed to fatalities, I still began by 
distinguishing between the different paramilitaries responsible for the attack. In order to better 
understand paramilitary strategies, I grouped attacks by target: military/security versus 
nonmilitary. I chose this division because at many points during the Troubles, paramilitary 
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combatants emphasized their perception that they were in a war with the ‘British occupiers.’ 
Counterarguments often emphasized the idea that, despite such claims, paramilitaries focused 
more of their energy on targeting innocent civilians and terrorizing populations than on attacking 
representatives of the British state. Separating these targets allowed me to examine such 
assertions. The GTD provides basic information about targets. Using these details, I grouped 
attacks targeting members of the army or security forces, elements of the British security 
infrastructure (military barracks, police stations, etc.), or hijackings in which hijacked vehicles 
were used to attack either of the aforementioned targets as security targets. All other targets are 
classified as ‘nonmilitary.’ Figure 4.5 details this breakdown of security and nonmilitary targets. 
Security Nonmilitary 
Bus (excluding Tourist) 
Military Barracks/Base/Headquarters/Check Post 
Police Buildings (Headquarters/Stations/School) 
Police Patrol (including vehicles and convoys) 





Laborers (General)/Occupation Identified 
Political Party Members/Rallies 
Named Civilians 
Police Security Forces/Officers 
Places of Worship 
Non-State Militia 
Marketplace/Plaza/Square (where many people 
gather) 
Politicians/Political Parties/Political 
Movements/Political Party Meetings/Rallies 
Race/Ethnicity Identified 
Public Areas (e.g., Public garden, parking lot, garage, 









Village/cities/towns/suburb (large area) 
Figure 3.5: Coding scheme for terrorist attack targets as recorded in the GTD 
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Within the category of attacks against nonmilitary targets, I further separated ‘public’ attacks 
(those that endangered large numbers of innocent civilians or passersby) from ‘targeted’ attacks 
(that involved minimal risk to those not directly targeted). I base this coding on Kalyvas’ theory 
of selective violence, which explains the “likelihood of violence as a function of [political] 
control” certain forms of violence prove more advantageous to nonstate actors than others. 50 
Kalyvas distinguishes between selective and indiscriminate violence.
51
 In this 
context selective violence refers to acts of force designed to convey certain messages to 
a specific audience; while indiscriminate violence is violence in which anyone can 
become a victim regardless of one’s political affiliation or actions. He argues selective 
violence is preferable to indiscriminate violence because it consolidates an actor’s 
control over a region more effectively than does indiscriminate violence. Selective 
violence, however, is most likely in regions of contested control in which one actor 
holds more power than its rival but fails to monopolize authority. In situations of 
complete control or parity between rivals, violence is unlikely; whereas zones of no 
control tend to see mostly indiscriminate violence. By this logic levels of violence, 
reflect different distributions of power among rivals . 
Building off Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence, when analyzing patterns of terrorist 
attacks after the Good Friday Peace Agreement, I divide more indiscriminate, public attacks 
from cases of targeted violence. According to Kalyvas, groups theoretically prefer to use targeted 
violence and will do so when they have the influence, opportunity, and resources. By separating 
these different forms of violence, I hoped to better understand the nature of post-ceasefire 
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violence and the strengths, goals, and strategies of armed nonstate actors. Given the 
shortcomings of using fatality data as a proxy for political violence, I use the GTD as a 
robustness test of my findings when measuring political violence in terms of fatalities.  
Terrorist Events Analysis and Limitations 
Using terrorist attacks as a measure of political violence continues to challenge the 
central principles of H1 and H2 that peace processes both divide moderates and militants and 
change the way nonstate actors evaluate and deploy violence. Between 1980 and 1989, Troubles-
related attacks accounted for 26.78% of all the terror attacks in Western Europe. While fatalities 
from the Troubles dropped throughout the 1990s, political violence in Northern Ireland 
accounted for approximately 29.19% of all the terrorist attacks in Western Europe, which is not a 
statistically significant change from the violence of the preceding decade, suggesting consistency 
in both pre and post ceasefire violence. 
When measuring political violence in terms of terrorist incidents, IMV also still emerges 
as a consistent feature of conflict both before and after ceasefires. One way in which the data 
may support H1 or H2 is that IMV spikes in 1995 and 1996, following the first paramilitary 
ceasefires. These attacks were largely the work of an organization called Direct Action Against 
Drugs (DAAD) and the INLA, which had not agreed to the ceasefire and was waging an internal 
feud at the time. While participation in the peace process was a matter of debate during the INLA 
feud, the conflict of 1995 and 1996 had its roots in a rivalry between Gino Gallagher and Hugh 
Torney. According to Henry MacDonald 
Gallagher had been in conflict with Torney since 1992. After the UDA massacre of 
Catholics…on the Ormeau, Gallagher…had urged that the INLA take retaliatory action. Torney 
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had refused to sanction it. The bad feeling between the two increased when Gallagher took over 
the leadership, and expelled the former chief of staff.
52 
The deaths in this feud were highly personalized, launched largely in a retaliatory tit-for-tat style 
between the Gallagher’s INLA and Torney’s INLA-GHQ. Similarly, fatalities attributable to 
DAAD had largely been justified as ‘community policing’ and punishment of drug dealers. Such 
violence appears far more consistent with a strategy of consolidating and maintaining power in a 
region rather than with a strategy of undermining peace negotiations. In fact, many argue that 
DAAD was formed as a front group for the PIRA specifically so that the PIRA could continue to 
claim to be on ceasefire.  
While it is important not to overstate the uniqueness of IMV to post-accord 
environments, IMV remains an important topic to consider when studying splinter groups and 
the continued use of armed force because it is one of the clearest ways of observing how factions 
compete, negotiate, and form alliances. These cases of IMV, particularly the existence and 
behavior of DAAD, provide examples of cases in which the purpose of CPV appears to be 
something other than undermining or rejecting peace negotiations. Unfortunately, further 
exploration of the various purposes for which actors use violence is a topic requires more detail 
than I can include in this current paper and remains a topic in need of further study. 
One of the limitations of the GTD, however, is its focus on global trends in terrorism as 
oposed to local patterns of violence in specific case studies. When I attempted to plot the 
information from the GTD on a map, I found that a large number of entries were geocoded for 
Belfast city centre. The Global Terrorism Database records 4,540 Troubles-related terrorist 
attacks, 2,201 occuring in or around Belfast. Looking more closely at republican attacks between 
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1996 and 2013, however, I found that many incidences geocoded for the city centre had occurred 
in other parts of the city. In fact, for the year 1996 and onwards, the GTD records 24 republican 
terrorist attacks occurring right outside Belfast City Hall. I found that only one of these 24 
entries actually occurred in the reported location.  
While the GTD remains the most exhaustive, geocoded databases available, there remain 
a number of issues that constrain its analytic utility.  First, the GTD includes only events that 
qualify as ‘terrorism.’ The GTD defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force 
and violence by a nonstate actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through 
fear, coercion, or intimidation.”53 As a result, the GTD distinguishes between terrorism and 
events associated with organized crime, hate crime, inter/intra-group conflict, and insurgency or 
other guerilla actions. This definition proves problematic when studying post-ceasefire 
paramilitarism in Northern Ireland.  
The problem with the GTD’s filtering of criminal and insurgent activity lies in the fact 
that a common method of delegitimizing nonstate actors is to label them ‘criminals’ or 
‘terrorists.’ The GTD uses a category of ‘Doubt Terrorism Proper’ to mark when events may be 
the result of crime, insurgency, or internal conflict rather than terrorism. In these cases, while 
database creators had some doubts about whether a particular event qualified as terrorism, they 
lacked sufficient evidence to exclude the event entirely. It is, therefore, reasonable to infer that 
events that the START team considered clear examples of criminal activity, guerilla warfare, or 
intra- and inter-group conflicts are not included in the database. It is unclear from looking at the 
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Global Terrorism Database, however, how its creators distinguished between actions politicians 
dismissed as criminality or lawlessness and legitimate forms of political violence.  
 The GTD limits its entries to events considered ‘terrorism’ as opposed to more general 
political violence. As a result, while the database includes some so called ‘punishment beatings’ 
(generally considered a form of vigilante justice), in other cases these events are considered 
examples of crime or internal-group conflict and, therefore, excluded from the database. The 
GTD also excludes violence deemed ‘insurgent or guerilla action.’ This filtering mechanism 
provides incomplete counts of paramilitary activity. Examining the events that GTD include 
casts doubt on accuracy of some of these judgements. In some cases, attacks against the loyalist 
paramilitary, the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), are coded as attacks against the military 
whereas in other cases targeting the UDA is considered targeting a terrorist organization or 
militia. Such inconsistency in coding raises concerns that violence perpetrated by certain pro-
state armed actors may be considered military or security action and, therefore, excluded from 
the database. The case-specific coding also proves questionable when it codes the Social and 
Democratic Labour Party (SDLP), which focused exclusively on constitutional and electoral 
political organizing, as a violent political party.  
Qualitative Analysis 
As demonstrated by the cases of the INLA and DAAD between 1995 and 1996, 
qualitative evidence further challenges H1 and H2 because such study does not reveal origins of 
violent ‘dissident’ republican organizations to any clear desire to undermine political 
negotiations or doubts about leaders’ credibility.  As MacDonald and Holland note,  
[m]any of those who remained with the Official republican movement…had done so not because 
they necessarily agreed with the leadership’s views on the future course republicanism might take 
but because they suspected the Provisionals of not having any real politics at all. Many others had 
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remained simply because of personal loyalties, which often play a more crucial role than 
ideological reasons in deciding who goes with what faction.
54
  
While most conventional explanations of the 1969 split emphasize the conflict between the 
‘moderate Officials’ and ‘militant Provisionals,’ MacDonald and Holland suggest that among the 
rank and file ideology mattered much less than among the leadership. The split of the CIRA from 
the PIRA in “1986 can be seen as a power struggle within the leadership which was accompanied 
by tensions surrounding the gradual politicization”55 Similarly, a self-proclaimed nonviolent 
dissident republican and former member of the PIRA observed that “the contention that formed 
the real IRA was within leadership figures.”56 The disagreement between Gerry Adams and 
alleged founder of the rIRA, Michael McKevitt, is usually interpreted as a case of the 
intransigent militant rejecting the compromise and negotiation of his moderate counterpart. 
Wendy Pearlman, however, uses George Tsebelis’ concept of a nested game to claim that post-
ceasefire violence challenges “not only the substance of policies but also the very process of 
collective decisionmaking and the legitimacy of claims to represent the collective.”57 The 
prospect of a political negotiation may put strain on existing coalitions, reigniting old rivalries 
among leaders. While often justified in terms of acceptance or rejection of the peace process, the 
lines of division that form when a splinter group emerges are not built only on members’ 
acceptance or rejection of the peace process. Rather, groups like the Real IRA organize around 
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subgroups loyal to existing leadership figures like McKevitt who allegedly "had immense 
standing within the Provos and commanded huge respect” within the PIRA.58  
While McKevitt certainly opposed the Good Friday Agreement, it is unclear whether the 
root of his conflict with the PIRA and Sinn Fein lies in disagreement over the peace process or in 
an ongoing struggle for leadership within the republican movement. Horgan notes that McKevitt, 
prior to splitting with the Adams leadership, was an active member of the PIRA Army 
Executive. During negotiations among Republicans, Loyalists, and the British state, however, 
“[t]he executive had largely been excluded.”59 In fact, the IRA ceasefire of 1997 “was called 
without the full support of the Executive.”60 Within this context, McKevitt’s defection from the 
PIRA in 1997 appears to be more a consequence of the internal competition for power between 
the Army Executive and Army Council than a response to the peace process alone. 
Conclusion 
Arguing CPV is about undermining the peace or the result of nonstate actors’ inability to 
trust the peace process implies that nonstate actors use violence differently before and after a 
peace process begins. My study found no evidence to suggest that peace processes alter the way 
armed nonstate actors think about or employ violence (a premise on which H1 and H2 depend). 
Data on fatalities and terrorist attacks suggests that while a majority of post-GFA violence has 
been intra-movement violence, IMV was a consistent form of violence throughout the Troubles. 
Contrary to the predictions of H1 and H2, this IMV did not center on conflicts between moderate 
and militant elements within a movement. Rather, violence appears to be specifically targeted 
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against individuals loyal to rival leaders or an issue of demonstrating paramilitary strength in a 
certain area. Furthermore, the consistency in Troubles-related fatalities from factionalism 
suggests that patterns in inter-factional as well as intra-factional violence share many similarities 
before and after the peace process. This consistency challenges H1 and H2, which emphasize 
peace processes’ transformative effect on political violence. In Chapter 4, I explore potential 





CHAPTER 4: Rethinking Political Violence 
Alternative Explanations for CPV 
Arguments about insecurity and attempts to undermine the peace process assume 
that processes of division and factionalization are intrinsically linked with debates over 
political settlements between militant extremists and moderate, constitutionalists. In 
fact, Stedman argues that “[p]eace processes create spoilers…spoilers exist only when 
there is a peace processes to undermine, that is, after at least two warring parties have 
committed themselves publically to a pact or have signed a comprehensive peace 
agreement.”61  Security dilemma arguments like those of Roe and Posen suggest that 
“[n]egotiations would succeed in designing peaceful transitions if the participants could 
be protected during the implementation period;” therefore linking levels of  paramilitary 
CPV with the degree to which actors find themselves trapped by the security dilemma.
62
 
By assuming that violence would not occur during peace processes without the presence 
of spoilers or uncertainty, Kydd and Walter, Stedman, Posen, and Roe cast cooperation 
and collective action as a default while disunity and intra-movement antagonism are 
considered aberrations from the norm.  
At first glance, a bias towards collective action appears theoretically sound. After 
all, “[f]indings indicate that the existence of multiple groups in civil wars has important 
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implications for war outcomes...both the number of groups and their relations matter.” 63 
The presence of more rebel groups means that a state or opposing force must divide its 
resources, thereby lessening the burden on each of the individual rebel groups. When 
rebel groups actively collaborate, they can collectively improve their strength relative to 
the government by sharing resources, strategies, and information. It makes sense, then 
that, should the prospect of politically negotiated peace make collective action more 
costly than collaboration, the actors would divide into factions. Consequently, it is  
reasonable to infer that factionalization would occur more frequently during periods of 
peace negotiation than during other periods of a conflict. By this logic, individuals with 
varying degrees of militancy and political conviction organize under a common 
movement. The introduction of a peace process, however, divides moderates and 
militants, causing the latter to break away from the parent group and form a splinter 
organization committed to the continued use of political violence. This conceptualization 
of nonstate actors (illustrated in Figure 4.1) reflects what is commonly known as the 






Figure 4.1: Unitary Actor Model 
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Since the mid-twenty-first century, however, scholars have increasingly 
questioned the validity of analyzing nonstate actors using a unitary-actor model. Despite 
this, theories of ‘spoiler’ violence continue to utilize this framework. According to Diani 
“although social movements and coalitions consist of dense interorganizational networks 
only the former display high levels of collective identity.
64
 Management theory holds 
that a “coalition is defined as two or more parties who cooperate to obtain a mutually 
desired outcome that satisfies the interests of the coalition rather than those of the entire 
group in which it is embedded…coalitions are temporary alliances designed to increase 
individual coalition members’ outcomes on a particular issue; when the issue is resolved, 
the coalition dissolves.”65 Consequently, if subgroups feel that they do not have enough 
of a voice in the negotiating process by remaining within a movement, they may 
withdraw from a coalition and attempt to pursue their own interests directly.  
The notion that factions emerge when the costs of collective action outweigh the 
benefits implies that certain divisions and sub-groupings within a movement might pre-
date peace negotiations. Unlike spoiler and security dilemma explanations, a collective 
action-based model of group formation and factionalization conceptualizes movements 
not as a united front but as a coalition of groups temporarily allied in pursuit of an 
overarching common interest (Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.2: Nonunitary Actor Model 
Using this model of substate organizations as nonunitary actors, I propose that it 
may be possible to understand trends in Northern Ireland’s CPV if one accepts that 
Putnam’s two-level game applies both to state and non-state actors. According to 
Putnam, policymaking and international relations involve a two-level game in which “At 
the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government 
to adopt favorable policies, and the politicians seek power by constructing coalitions 
among groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their 
own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing adverse consequences of 
foreign developments.”66 Figure 4.3 illustrates the sub-state application of the two-level 
game. 
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Figure 4.3: Two-Level Game Modified for Substate Actors 
At the intramovement level, local actors and sub-groups pressure the movement’s central 
leadership to adopt different agenda items, while the central, political elites attem pt to 
gain power by creating coalitions. At the intermovement level each movement’s 
leadership seeks to maximize its ability to satisfy local, subgroup demands while 
minimizing adverse consequences of negotiating with representatives of states or 
members of other movements. These political elites encounter an additional level of 
complexity if negotiations include one or more state actors. In the multi -level game, 
subgroups weigh the costs and benefits of collective action while central leadership 
performs a cost-benefit analysis of accommodating subgroup demands.  Within the 
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context of negotiations, some demands that the central leadership previously 
accommodate may become too costly to include in a negotiation agenda or subgroups 
may overestimate the bargaining clout they hold within a movement.  
CPV as a Product of Power 
Existing explanations for CPV conceptualize violence as oriented towards peace 
negotiations; thereby ignoring the possibility that nonstate actors might use violence or 
break into factions for other reasons. This bias is evident in statements like Martin 
McGuiness’ regarding violent dissident republicans claiming that “those people who are 
trying to destabilise [the peace] need to understand that the task they’re involved in will 
have no good outcome for them. There is no prospect whatsoever of these people 
destroying the Peace Process.”67 
Because all the hypotheses predict that certain armed nonstate actors will 
continue to use CPV, it is necessary to evaluate not whether violence is present but 
rather in what way violence occurs. Stathis Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence 
emphasizes the importance of a movement’s internal balance of power.  Kalyvas 
distinguishes between selective and indiscriminate violence. In this context selective 
violence refers to acts of force designed to convey certain messages to a specific 
audience; while indiscriminate violence is violence in which anyone can become a 
victim regardless of one’s political affiliation or actions.  The selective violence model 
explains the “likelihood of violence as a function of [political] control” and predicts that 
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the balance of power within a region changes the types of violence that occur there.
68
  
Kalyvas’ analysis centers on coercive violence (violence meant to control a population) 
against civilian populations; however it is possible to follow his train of logic through to 
violence between combatants of rival factions and to periods of ceasefire and political 
negotiation. From the observation that varying levels of political control shape the types 
of violence groups can employ, I propose that it may be possible to also explain the 
presence of CPV by examining the levels of control organizations have over their own 
members. This logic produces H3: 
H3: (Organizational Weakness) Organization leaders direct violence so that 
it reflects a particular political or organizational agenda; any violence that 
deviates from this pattern results from a lack of political leadership within 
an organization. In the case of peace processes, politically directed 
violence reflects division of political opinion among a movement’s 
leadership while seemingly apolitical violence indicates that political 
leaders have lost their monopoly over the use of force.  
As evinced by the statistics on intra-movement violence in Northern Ireland, factions 
feud and compete with each other outside of periods of political negotiation, presumably 
over issues unrelated to peace; therefore it makes sense that these issues would continue 
to shape violence after the introduction of a peace process.  
Much contemporary research on coalitions and nonstate actors suggests that a 
nonunitary actor model best explains this factionalization. Consequently, 
factionalization is best understood not as the reorganization of actors but rather as a 
return to and alliance of different subgroupings in the face of threat to that particular 
subgroup’s interests.  Fotini Christia’s research on alliance formation and coalition 
building reinforces the idea that threat to a subgroup can prompt actors to reeva luate 
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their membership in a movement. Christia argues that “relative power drives alliance 
choices.”69 Christia argues that within a coalition “each group wants to be part of a 
coalition that is large enough to win the war but also small enough to maximize the 
group’s share of postwar power.”70 These internal dynamics predict that “a decisive 
victory will lead to bandwagoning, with smaller parties wanting to join on the side of the 
winner, whereas an expectation of a negotiated settlement or of continued figh ting with 
no clear winner will perpetuate a balancing configuration among the warring parties 
until the end of hostilities.”71 Consequently, under Christia’s model, a peace process 
matters in so much as it alters the balance of power within a movement. Using Christia’s 
balance of power model I propose H4: 
H4: (Windows of Opportunity or Vulnerability) Negotiations loosen existing 
hierarchies and power structures; thereby offering political elites (who use 
violence to pursue of both grand strategic goals and parochial interests or 
rivalries) a chance to shift the balance of power in their favor. Violence 
tends to follow preexisting lines of division or competition within and 
among factions. 
For the remainder of this chapter, I explore further the implications of each 
hypothesis and the ways in which they offer a more nuanced understanding of the 
conditions that produce CPV. 
Political Instrumentality and Organizational Strength Thesis  
In addition to Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence, Brendan O’Duffy’s analys is 
of violence in Northern Ireland also informs H3. While O’Duffy’s article dates from 
before the peace process had begun in earnest, his analysis remains useful because it 
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challenges the moderate-militant binary and offers an alternative explanation for 
paramilitary activity. O’Duffy suggests that “while affective motivations may be primary 
determinants of the strength of attachment to a nationalist cause, they are largely 
contained by organizations which use violence instrumentally to pursue  political goals or 
defend political interests.”72 According to O’Duffy, changes in the targets and intensity 
of paramilitary violence mirror shifting strategic objectives, opportunity structures, and 
the organizational strength of the paramilitary organizations.  
O’Duffy’s political instrumentality thesis envisions the presence of a peace 
process as one of many factors shaping actors’ decisions rather than as the key variable 
determining whether factions continue to use force. He contends that paramilit ary groups 
generally maintain tight control over the use of force and “focus it towards strategic, 
ethno-national objectives.”73 He attributes the infamous Shankill Butchers murder gang’s 
reign of terror between 1975 and 1982 to a lack of loyalist political  leadership and a 
subsequent inability of loyalist elites to “exert control over their hard men.” 74  O’Duffy 
claims that division within leadership weakens central control over the use of force, thereby 
implying that what Stedman would term ‘spoiler’ violence may have its roots not in any attempt 
to undermine political overtures but rather in the fact that elite weakness loosened the 
organization’s ability to control instances of intra-movement violence.  
Expanding upon this claim, O’Duffy claims that, had it not been for the 
internment of suspected loyalists in 1973 and the arrest of a large proportion of the UVF 
leadership in 1975, “‘psychopathic’ killers…would never have been allowed to pursue 
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their campaigns of indiscriminate killing, ignoring leadership’s attempts to st em the 
campaign of assassination against nationalists…[in favor of] a political program.”75 
O’Duffy holds that any deviation from the strategic use of political violence, like the 
activities of the Shankill Butchers, suggests a breakdown in paramilitary organizational 
strength. In emphasizing organizational strength, O’Duffy challenges the moderate -
militant binary. He suggests that when paramilitaries function properly, violence retains 
a political goal, meaning that if political elites commit to a political agenda, the 
organization will deploy violence in a way that supports these objectives. Conversely, 
weakened leadership structures and organizational infrastructure, not radicalized politics 
among dissident elements of a movement, explains seemingly indiscriminate or extreme 
forms of violence. The breakdown of a movement or emergence of factions has its roots 
in weak leadership rather than differing political opinion.  
Like O’Duffy, H3 suggests that, throughout a conflict and into periods of peace 
negotiation, leaders use violence in pursuit of a political agenda. The best predictors of whether 
an organization will continue violence into periods of political negotiation and ceasefire are 
either the interests and strength of political elites and organizational leadership or a weakened 
organizational leadership and subsequent inability of political elites to monopolize the use of 
force. Under H3 it would not be surprising to see CPV because peace processes tends to divide 
and weaken leaders as constituents become frustrated either with the pace of a peace process or 
the compromises necessary. This frustration can be rooted in mistrust of the leadership or a 
divide among moderates and militants; however H3 holds that these factors alone do not explain 
                                                          
75
 O’Duffy, 756 
65 
 
CPV. Rather, CPV occurs when political leaders lose control over their hardened thugs, 
unleashing a new wave of apolitical, opportunistic violence.  
Windows of Opportunity and Vulnerability 
There have been some preliminary efforts to explain ‘spoiler’ violence as a 
product of competition within a movement over the balance of power.
76
 While Wendy 
Pearlman uses the language of ‘spoiler’ violence she echoes Christia when she proposes an 
‘internal contestation model’ of CPV, claiming that “[a]ctors turn to negotiating or spoiling to 
contest both what a proposed settlement entails and who has the power to decide this and other 
matters on behalf of their community…participation in spoiling of negotiations offers an 
opportunity to advance their struggle for political dominance.”77  Like Christia, Pearlman 
emphasizes the importance of expected returns from a negotiated settlement when she 
argues that  
leaders of the dominant faction [within a movement] are likely to have the most to gain 
from a peace process, as they can expect to be the ones invited to participate in 
negotiations. This outcome offers these individuals external recognition of their 




Contrary to the moderate-militant divide H1 and H2 predict, Kalyvas, Pearlman, and Christia 
argue that factionalization follows lines of division based on regional loyalties and competitions. 
I build off Christia’s theory of alliance formation and Wendy Pearlman’s internal 
contestation model to propose H4. Like Pearlman’s theory, H4 emphasizes the importance of 
the balance of power and argues that these divisions are over issues of power, such as positions 
of leadership or resource allocation rather than acceptance or rejection of a peace settlement. As 
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Pearlman notes, “[a] peace agreement, or even the prospect of a peace agreement, can heighten 
contestation over the terms of legitimate representation because it favors some factions and 
disfavors others.”79  
To understand H4, it is necessary to further establish why and how periods of political 
negotiation provide actors with windows of opportunity or vulnerability. As Christia argues, 
conflicts generally end in one of three outcomes, each of which encourages actors to pursue 
different behavior: “(1) no prospects for a settlement or no obvious winner, leading to balancing; 
(2) prospects for negotiated settlement, also leading to balancing; or (3) an obvious winner 
emerging, leading to bandwagoning behavior.”80 According to Christia, one may expect warring 
parties to bandwagon (or ally with the victor) if it becomes clear that the victor cannot be 
stopped by an opposing coalition. The logic of bandwagoning is that subgroups would rather be a 
‘junior partner’ in a winning coalition than any part of a losing side.  
Conversely, Christia predicts balancing behavior, or opposition to the dominant party, in 
the case of a negotiated settlement and in cases where it is possible to prolong the conflict. She 
argues that as long as there is a possibility that subgroups may secure more bargaining leverage, 
these elements will oppose stronger parties that might take the lion’s share of postwar power. 
The capacity of certain factions to influence a peace process consequently means that 
periods of political negotiation heighten asymmetries of power within coalitions and 
movements. Negotiations give asymmetries of power within a movement additional 
importance because, with the addition of new negotiating parties, political elites have to 
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make more decisions about which local, subgroup interests they will accommodate and 
incorporate into the movement-wide platform.  
H4 combines this study of balancing and bandwagoning behavior with Pearlman’s 
internal contestation model. Under H4, subgroups attempt to balance against more powerful 
elements within a movement to explain the formation of splinter organizations during periods of 
political negotiation. The addition of Christia’s balancing and bandwagoning argument 
strengthens Pearlman’s claim by specifying the conditions under which H4 is most likely to play 
a role: cases, such as the negotiation of the Belfast Agreement, in which there is no clear winner.  
Comparing Hypotheses 
At first glance, the logic of H4 appears to be simply another way of stating H1 or H2. 
Arguably H2 involves balance of power issues because subgroups feel threatened by an 
impending peace negotiation and, consequently refuse to adopt strictly nonviolent methods of 
protest. Similarly, one may propose that H1 accounts for internal balances of power because – in 
cases with no clear winner – political elites are unable to make credible guarantees to different 
elements within their movement, prompting mistrust and a return to violence. H4 remains 
distinct from H1 and H2, however, in that, while actors under H1 use violence because they do 
not trust the peace negotiations and actors under H2 use violence because they do not want 
peace, H4 suggests that actors continue using violence because they are dissatisfied with the 
current balance of power and with their anticipated share of post-accord power.  
This distinction proves important when considering possible strategies of 
counterinsurgency and cooptation. If actors do not trust a peace negotiation or do not want a 
peace negotiation, the likelihood of being able to coopt these elements and incorporate them into 
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negotiations appears slim. However, if actors prefer violence over negotiation because they are 
dissatisfied with the internal balance of power, this understanding leaves room for more potential 
negotiations. It is possible that actors who have already agreed to political negotiation may have 
an interest in keeping splinter groups out of the negotiation because they are unwilling to shift 
the balance of power. In this case, negotiations open not only windows of opportunity for certain 
subgroups to attempt to increase their own share of power but also windows of vulnerability for 
those subgroups that are favorably situated within the movement’s hierarchy or structural 
network. Consequently, rather than relying on the centralized political elites to negotiate with 
their “rogue” constituencies, mediators may be served better by communicating directly with 
armed groups. 
Unlike spoiler violence theorists and security dilemma advocates, H3 allows for 
the possibility that, in some cases, certain forms of violence, including CPV, reflect 
organizational weakness within a paramilitary rather than disagreements over the peace 
process itself. For example, according to O’Duffy, the bla tantly sectarian violence of the 
Shankill Butchers represented not a disagreement over whether the UVF should pursue a 
political agenda but rather a simple campaign of serial murder against apolitical targets 
by a rogue group within the UVF. This third hypothesis argues that if organizations with 
strong leaders divide, it will be along political lines, and only organizations with weak leadership 
will engage in patterns of violence that lack a clear political agenda.  
In contrast, H4 uses the arguments of Kalyvas, Pearlman, and Christia to predict that 
factionalization will follow parochial rather than political lines of cleavage regardless of the 
strength of an organization’s leadership. In fact, they go so far as to claim that localized conflicts 
and competitions often directly shape patterns of political violence, as local and supralocal actors 
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attempt to unite political and personal interests. Pearlman even notes that “[i]n the internal 
contestation model, some of the negotiating or spoiling that is supposedly intended to alter the 
course of the conflict is actually designed to contest leadership over and representation of a 
single national community.”81 Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence conceptualizes a 
relationship between armed actors and populations in which “the interaction between the 
political and the private spheres” shapes political violence.82 The means through which 
political actors and local entrepreneurs unite these spheres is an ‘alliance’ or an 
arrangement in which “[supralocal actors] provide the latter with the external muscle, 
thus allowing them to win decisive advantage over local rivals; in exchange supralocal 
actors are able to tap into local networks and generate mobilization.” 83 The relationship 
between supralocal (national, regional, etc.) and local actors means that, in shaping the 
balance of power within a region, “local cleavages matter. Although these cleavages are 
not the only mechanism producing allegiance and violence, they appear to have a 
substantial impact on the distribution of allegiances as well as the targets and intensity 
of violence.”84 Kalyvas cites numerous cases in which civil war and the language of 
political ideology masked animosities that had their roots in familial links, neighborhood 
rivalries, and personal interests.  
While Kalyvas focuses his analysis more on the onset and conduct of civil wars 
than on the termination of such conflicts, it is not unreasonable to explore the possibility 
that similar mechanisms continue to shape CPV. In other words, if “local cleavages may 
even subvert central ones, causing factional conflicts within supposedly unified political 
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camps” during civil wars, it would be a reasonable to argue that parochial interests 
continue to shape armed nonstate actors’ behavior after a elites begin to negotiat e 
peace.
85
 Fotini Christia has also emphasized the importance of parochialism in civil 
wars, arguing that “[factional] subgroups tend to be led by local elites…and differ from 
each other along regional lines; they may also have leadership disputes between them 
that predate the war. Critically, these subgroups exist and are identifiable prior to the 
onset of the war.”86 Kalyvas and Christia both suggest that movements are best described 
as coalitions of localized subgroups rather than unitary actors; furthermore they argue it 
is power rather than political ideology that drives civil war violence. The coalitions that 
Kalyvas and Christia describe challenge conventional interpretations of CPV that stress 
moderate-militant binaries as the primary determinants of whether actors engage in or 
reject political negotiations.   
Neither H3 nor H4 rejects the possibility of conflict between “moderate” and “militant” 
elements; however H3 and H4 consider factionalization during peace processes a dynamic, 
multi-faceted process that extends beyond the moderate-militant divide. These hypotheses allow 
one to examine long-term reasons for intra-movement competition, including but not limited to 
different attitudes towards compromise. Consequently, under H4, it is also possible to envision a 
situation in which leaders may use their monopoly over the use of force for seemingly apolitical 
objectives, such as in prosecution of local rivalries and power struggles.  Unlike H3, H4 does not 
suggest that only groups with weak or contested leadership dissolve. Christia argues that 
factionalization is a consistent feature of civil wars, claiming that “Wartime alliances, 
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and the groups that comprise them, are not merely imagined but rather constantly 
reimagined communities.”87 Christia further emphasizes this consistency by arguing that, 
as the relative balance of power within an alliance changes throughout the course of a 
civil war, so too does a subgroup’s commitment to upholding the alliance.  
In the case of “an asymmetric loss experienced by a group’s constituent 
subgroups…groups will fracture along prewar cleavages, be they regional differences or 
preexisting leadership disputes.”88 This process of factionalization can happen at any 
point during a conflict and results from changes in the internal balance of power within a 
coalition and changes in subgroups’ ability to pursue strategic and political goals within 
a coalition rather than from the introduction of external factors, such as a peace process. 
Consequently, political negotiations are most significant because they weaken the common 
interest that previously bonded factions under a coalition. Without a common, unifying interest, 
pre-existing differences of political opinion gain salience and begin to play a larger role in 
shaping actors’ behavior during periods of peace negotiation. 
In contrast, arguments about organizational structure and political instrumentality 
focus on objectives, opportunity, and internal organization and suggest that violence 
resurfaces when leaders are unable to control the methods through which constituents 
pursue their political objectives. Furthermore, the theories envision different roles for 
peace negotiations in shaping and propagating violence. 
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 In the following chapter, I explore further the benefits of shifting away from explanations 
of CPV that emphasize H1 and H2 and towards more nuanced approaches like H3 and H4 that 
consider contemporary theories and insights into the way nonstate actors organize and form 
alliances. The four hypothesis that have been introduced are summarized in Figure 4.4. 
Hypothesis Driving Mechanism Role of Peace Process Base Literature 
H1: Security Dilemma Uncertainty/Mistrust 
Divides moderates and 
militants 
Posen 
H2: Spoiling Behavior 
Desire to undermine 
peace process 
Kydd and Walter, 
Stedman, Roe  
H3: Organizational 
Weakness 
Loss of political 
monopoly over the use 
of force/dominance of 




by weakening central 
leadership 
Kalyvas, O’Duffy 
H4: Windows of 
Opportunity or 
Vulnerability 
Chance to shift the 
internal balance of 





asymmetries of power 
Christia, Kalyvas, 
Pearlman 
Figure 4.4: Hypotheses and CPV 
In the next chapter, I perform some preliminary analyses testing the plausibility of H3 and H4. 
Due to the more complex nature of these hypotheses, the data I used to test H1 and H2 proves 
marginally useful but ultimately insufficient to produce any concrete inferences. Consequently, 
Chapter 5 also outlines the types of data and research that would be necessary to more 
successfully test H3 and H4. 
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CHAPTER 5: Experimental Empirics 
While I had initially hoped to replicate the types of tests I performed on H1 and H2 with 
H3 and H4, I quickly realized that current methods of data collection and measuring political 
violence are insufficient to test more nuanced explanations for CPV. This chapter will, therefore, 
focus mostly on the possible uses of GIS mapping and conflict databases for understanding 
patterns of political violence. While very much a work in progress, I consider the strategies I 
outline promising areas of future research and topics highly deserving of more detailed scrutiny 
than I can accommodate within the purview of this paper. In lieu of more reliable data, I perform 
a brief qualitative analysis evaluating the validity of both H3 and H4. 
Preliminary Analysis 
As with H1 and H2, I examined fatality and terrorism data in relation to the 
following three questions: 
1) What types of violence characterize peace processes and how does this differ from 
periods outside of a peace process? Following the introduction of a peace process, does 
one observe statistically significant changes in the targets, weapons used in an attack, and 
groups responsible for (a) fatalities (b) incidents of political violence? If not, when does 
one observe statistically significant changes? 
2) When does one observe statistically significant spikes in violence between 
subgroups within the same coalition, or intra-movement violence (IMV), and 
what forms of IMV is most dominant (faction 1 versus faction 2, infighting within 
a faction)? Does one observe different clusters of intra-factional as opposed to 
inter-factional violence? 
3) How does the spatial distribution of different IMV relate, if at all, to the spatial 
distribution of paramilitary strongholds and/or local voting patterns?  
Regarding Question 1 (types of violence one sees during peace processes), if 
well-organized factions focus more on targeted attacks designed to eliminate dissi dent 
elements either by assassination, imprisonment, or political delegitimization, this 
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evidence would be consistent with H3. Additionally, these actions would not be limited 
to ‘militants.’ Crime and apolitical violence would spike within organizations lacking 
strong leadership. Finally evidence consistent with H4 would include examples of 
violence in which well-organized factions focus both on political and economic gain, 
increasing not only targeted attacks against rivals but also campaigns to take contro l of 
resources. Violence might also result in changes of leadership within factions or the 
targeting and/or emergence of splinter groups and organizations. These organizations 
would not necessarily be comprised of ‘militants.’ 
 In terms of Question 2 (forms of IMV), if my evidence is consistent with H3, low 
level inter-factional violence would have been a consistent feature of paramilitary 
activity outside of the peace processes, as different factions clash in pursuit of their own 
interests. Because H3 emphasizes political elites’ ability to monopolize the use of force 
by members of their own factions, intra-factional violence would emerge primarily 
within disorganized groups. In contrast, H4 suggests that violence within factions is the 
product of internal competition rather than weak leadership. H4 would, therefore, predict 
that intra-factional violence will also occur within both well organized and disorganized 
groups. If I see a case in which the frequency of both inter-factional and intra-factional 
violence increase around the introduction of a peace process but both forms of intra -
movement violence have been consistent features of paramilitary activity prior to the 
peace process, this evidence would be consistent with H4. 
 I investigate Question 3 (the spatial distribution of paramilitary activity) to see 
whether violence follows preexisting lines of divisions such as economic political theory 
(socialism, communism, etc) or is organized around competition for power and resources 
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within and among factions. Such evidence would be consistent with H4. H3 predicts that 
violence would occur in regions with weak leadership; this could include areas without 
strong traditional ties to any one paramilitary and, consequently, no clear group with a 
monopoly over the use of force. Under H3, I would also predict that violence would 
occur in paramilitary strongholds if certain organizations were undergoing a transition of 
leadership or a lack of leadership due to mass arrests and incarcerations. As when I was 
testing H1 and H2, I use GIS mapping to facilitate this analysis. 
Fatality Data and Analysis for H3 and H4 
Because H3 and H4 hold that CPV results from institutional and organizational 
weaknesses and because they consider peace processes one of many conditions that 
could weaken leadership and power structures, both hypotheses predict that IMV will 
emerge outside of periods of political negotiation. H3 suggests that any conditions that 
cause leaders to lose their monopoly over the use of force, such as transitions of 
leadership in the case of death, could prompt an outbreak of criminal and seemingly 
apolitical violence.  
As noted in Chapter 3, an analysis of Troubles-related fatalities demonstrates that 
factional competition and IMV exist outside of the context of political negotiations.  
Between 1968 and 1998, approximately 14% of the combatant fatalities in Belfast could 
be characterized as ‘intra-movement.’89 These fatality counts from intra-movement 
violence have remained at a relatively consistent level since the 1980s. While some of 
these deaths are believed to have part of the paramilitaries’ efforts to maintain discipline 
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within their ranks, of the all the intra-movement fatalities, approximately 23% of the 
loyalist fatalities involved more than one loyalist faction while about 43% of  the 
republican fatalities were inter-factional. Because inter-factional fatalities involved a 
member of one loyalist or republican paramilitary killed a member of a separate faction 
within its same umbrella movement, it is unlikely that the deaths were punitive, 
disciplinary actions. Additionally, these inter-factional deaths do not tend to cluster 
around periods of peace negotiations, thereby challenging the notion that, in the absence 
of a peace process, factions will tend to favor cooperation over competition. H1 and H2, 
which emphasize the way peace processes divide moderates and militants , are unable to 
account for such instances of intra-movement violence outside of periods of political 
negotiation. 
I argue that to fully understand the strategic calculus of armed nonstate groups during 
peace processes, one must examine long-term patterns of behavior within this organization. 
Coalitional politics rather than the degree of militancy serve as the best predictor of whether a 
faction will continue to use violence after its parent organization has already entered into 
political negotiations. Fatality data from 1994 through 2003 appears consistent with H3’s 
contention that paramilitary violence is generally politically motivated and strategically focused. 
Between 1994 and 2003, the average number of fatalities on attributable to republican 
paramilitaries was 9.6, a statistically significant drop from the preceding 10 years, during which 
the average fatality count was 38.
 90
 Instances during which the trends do not always align 
suggest moments where group cohesion would have been strained, meaning that centralized 
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leaders would not necessarily have maintained their usual monopoly over the use of force. For 
instance, fatalities from IMV remain the same or continue to increase in 1973, 1981, 1984, and 
1994 despite the fact that fatalities overall tend to decline during these periods. The years 1973, 
1981, 1984, and 1994 all mark turning points in Northern Ireland’s politics, years during which it 
was not unusual to see divisions and factions forming within a movement.
91
 1973 marks the year 
of the Sunningdale Agreement, under which Northern Ireland had a short-lived power-sharing 
system of governance. In 1981, republican prisoners in the H-blocks of the Maze/Long Kesh 
prison went on hunger strike, and Sinn Fein began to refocus republican attention on political 
action. In 1984, Irish and British politicians began a series of discussions that would produce the 
highly controversial Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985, under which both governments affirmed 
that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would only change with majority consent. 
Finally, in 1994, a large number of loyalist militias and the largest republican paramilitary, the 
IRA, declared tense ceasefires. 
IMV may account for a larger number the Troubles-related fatalities following 1998, but 
it has represented a shrinking percentage of Northern Ireland’s terrorist attacks overall. While 
almost all Troubles-related fatalities since 2001 have been the product of IMV, in those same 
years, IMV has accounted for fewer than ten percent of all annual terrorist attacks in Northern 
Ireland. For example, although 2013 saw growing numbers of Troubles-related fatalities (most of 
which were the result of IMV), IMV did not even account for three percent of the year’s terrorist 
attacks. This trend suggests that while contemporary IMV may be more lethal, it has not 
necessarily become more frequent. Under Kalyvas’ theory of selective violence, selective 
violence is preferable to indiscriminate violence because it consolidates an actor’s 
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control over a region more effectively than does indiscriminate violence. Selective 
violence, however, is most likely in regions of contested control in which one actor 
holds more power than its rival but fails to monopolize authority. In situations of 
complete control or parity between rivals, violence is unlikely; whereas zones of no 
control tend to see mostly indiscriminate violence.  This observation is consistent with H3’s 
prediction that organizational weakness gives rise to CPV as thugs and criminals exploit 
paramilitary authority in a region for their own enrichment. It is also consistent with H4’s 
suggestion that CPV results from intra-movement competition over power. This observation, 
however, contradicts H1 and H2’s prediction that violence will be perpetrated by rogue, fringe 
groups using terrorism as the ‘weapon of the weak.’  
Terrorism Data: Political Violence and Crime for H3 and H4 
When evaluating different explanations for CPV, the purpose for and motivation behind 
violence matters. Traditional ‘spoiling behavior’ explanations for political violence (H1 and H2) 
envision the use of force as a product of nonstate groups’ attitudes towards a peace process. 
According to these theories, the primary reason actors continue to use violence is either that they 
either do not trust the peace process or that they wish to undermine negotiations. Involvement in 
crime is generally interpreted as a fundraising effort. Others argue that “without a clear political 
purpose, [paramilitaries] started getting into organized crime, drug dealing and prostitution.”92 
Such arguments that organizations have strayed from their original political goals after being co-
opted by criminals interested in personal advancement echo the predictions of H3. An alternative 
explanation for the relationship between post-ceasefire paramilitarism and crime could be that, 
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without a common goal or centralized command structure, these organizations are now more 
prone to competition and intra-movement conflict and controlling or engaging with organized 
crime may be yet another way factions can compete for power (H4).  
Any efforts to measure the scale of violence in substate conflicts are inherently plagued 
by a potential selection effect. As one moves farther into the years considered post-peace process 
and constitutional, electoral strategies become institutionalized as the only legitimate forum for 
political dissent, it becomes increasingly likely that  politicians and media outlets will 
characterize incidences of violence as ‘crime’ or ‘intra/inter-group fighting.’ In recent years, 
members of mainstream Northern Irish political parties, such as Sinn Fein’s Martin McGuinness 
(himself a former member of the IRA) have decried contemporary paramilitaries as “traitors to 
the island of Ireland…[who] betrayed the political desires, hopes and aspirations of all of the 
[Irish] people…[and] don’t deserve to be supported by anyone.”93  
At this same press conference, Chief Constable Sir Hugh Orde assured the public that 
“collectively I am clear we will solve these crimes.”94 Scholars and politicians alike tend to 
characterize violence before 1998 as largely political and ideological and contrast these 
paramilitary activities with the “robberies, tax fraud, drinking clubs, smuggling, counterfeiting, 
and drug dealing” of contemporary paramilitaries.95 Robberies and crime, however, have long 
been strategies of paramilitary fundraising.
96
 Furthermore, Moran has argued that not only 
radical, fringe groups but also more mainstream paramilitaries continue to play an active role in 
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Northern Ireland’s criminal activity.97 By contrasting ‘contemporary’ paramilitaries (‘dissident’ 
republican groups like the CIRA or rIRA) with ‘pre-GFA’ paramilitaries (ie., the PIRA), scholars 
miss valuable opportunities to  explore the full diversity and extent of paramilitary activity in 
post-accord Northern Ireland.  
As Kalyvas has noted regarding arguments that ‘new wars’ are increasingly characterized 
by criminality, “[it] is highly possible that interpretations of recent civil wars that stress their 
depoliticization and criminalization are attributable more to the demise of the conceptual 
categories generated by the Cold War than the end of the Cold War per se.”98 It is also possible 
to apply this same logic to studies of post-peace process political violence. One must consider 
the possibility that a perceived decline in political violence may have more to do with the fact 
that elites benefit from labeling dissent as criminal activity and less to do with an actual decline 
in the frequency of violent political action. This is not to suggest that contemporary Northern 
Ireland is anywhere near as volatile as it was during the Troubles; however when one questions 
claims that crime has replaced political violence, it is possible to note a concerning pattern in 
paramilitary activity. After a period of steady decline following the GFA, the number of terrorist 
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Although the number of terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland has undeniably declined in 
recent years, as Figure 4.6 demonstrates, when one studies Northern Ireland’s paramilitary 
violence in relation to overall patterns of violence across Western Europe, it becomes difficult to 
distinguish between Northern Ireland’s violence of the 1980s and the paramilitary activity of the 
1990s. This observation reinforces the importance of questioning the way scholars distinguish 
between political violence and depoliticized, criminal activity. If Kalyvas is correct and 
perceived spikes in apolitical violence have more to do with a lack of conceptual categories than 
they do with actual changes in the levels of nonstate violence, it becomes all the more important 
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In fact, while Northern Ireland’s Troubles dropped from accounting for almost 80% of all 
Western European terrorist incidents during the height of the Troubles to a mere five percent 
within the first full year of the 1990s ceasefires, in 2013 Troubles-related violence accounted for 
close to half of all the terrorist attacks in Western Europe. As Figure 4.6 shows, contemporary 
levels of Troubles-related violence, as measured in relation to violence across Western Europe 
are at a larger percentage than has existed during the majority of the years since 1974.  
Conventional wisdom holds that this current (post-ceasefire) violence differs from pre-GFA 
violence in that paramilitaries are increasingly associated with drug trafficking and other 
organized crime, but scholars have yet to provide any quantitative evidence in support of the idea 
that contemporary violence is characterized more by criminality than by politics. Furthermore, 
such studies could prove useful in revising or clarifying the definition of political violence in a 
post-ceasefire context.  In lieu of any such concrete data, it seems premature to accept 
politicians’ claims that current violence is the work of ‘traitors’ and ‘criminals’ and, therefore, 
should not be compared to other forms of paramilitarism.   
Coding Neighborhoods 
 Most studies have examined traditional ‘orange-green’ maps, dividing Northern Ireland 
into predominantly Protestant and predominantly Catholic areas. While this division offers useful 
insights regarding overall patterns of Troubles-era violence, when studying competition within 
and among factions, a more detiled coding scheme becomes necessary. The spatial analysis I 
propose also requires understanding levels of paramilitary control in various regions. In this 
study, I begin exploring ways to measure paramililitary territorial claims, identifying 
neighborhoods by the dominant armed nonstate organization in the area.  
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With the help of Neil Jarman from the Institute of Conflict Research, I have identified 
neighborhoods in North and South Belfast as affiliated with either the Ulster Volunteer Force 
(UVF) or Ulster Defense Association (UDA). Since previous studies show that Catholics or 
Protestants were killed in CNR or PUL communities respectively, I seek to gain a better 
understanding of intra-movement violence by studying how violence was distributed in relation 
to areas associated with different paramilitaries.
100
 While a qualitative study of the rIRA’s 
formation suggests preliminary support for a model of factionalization and CPV that focuses on 
balance of power, I was curious whether H3 and H4 could be tested systematically using 
quantitative data. 
After talking to residents of Northern Ireland, I discovered that most people know which 
paramilitaries dominate each area and the reasons various factions are at odds with one another. 
Interestingly, there have been few scholarly efforts to gather and visually represent this 
information in any central location. Other methods of gathering information on paramilitaries 
that I tried were examining voting behavior for city councils and mapping the locations of 
memorials or murals recognizing different armed groups. It may be possible to gather 
information about support for dissident or radical politics based on the activity of ‘dissident’ 
political organizations; however given the overwhelming dominance of Sinn Féin and the 
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), focusing on voting behavior alone offers few insights into 
politics outside of the mainstream.  
It is also possible that studying street graffiti in support of different paramilitary 
organizations may prove illustrative; however, I will require far more rigorous exploration and 
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research before I can speak to the potential benefits of using street graffiti as a proxy for 
paramilitary presence. A final strategy of measuring territorial claims by different paramilitaries 
may be to study cases of punishment beatings, since paramilitaries generally carry out these acts 
in or around territory over which they hold a degree of influence. At present, however, it is 
unclear how one might gather reliable information on punishment beatings, a notoriously 
underreported crime. Asking residents seemed to be the most useful way to gather information 
about paramilitary presence in an area and is ultimately the strategy I would recommend 
pursuing in the future. 
Analyzing Neighborhoods and Limitations  
Initially, I had hoped to use murals and memorials to various paramilitaries as a proxy for 
paramilitary claims to a region. However, after checking the locations of murals and memorials 
against data on paramilitary strongholds I acquired from Neil Jarman, I found that memorials did 
not serve as a reliable proxy for paramilitary territorial claims (Figure 4.7).
101
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Figure 4.7: Map of Belfast with Memorials and Paramilitary Strongholds, 2015  
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 While some memorials certainly overlapped with areas in which various paramilitaries 
remain active, there were a number of areas in which the active paramilitary was not the only 
paramilitary to which memorials or murals were erected. An additional limitation to using 
memorials as a proxy for paramilitary presence is that many ‘dissident republicans’ do not have 
murals or memorials at present. Furthermore, memorials and murals generally do not capture the 
micropolitics of competition among regional commands or other localized tensions that might 
contribute to levels of IMV.  
 In my analysis, I have looked primarily at the way that violence reflects paramilitary 
territorial claims; however, it is also possible to envision a situation in which patterns of 
territorial claims, particularly by different factions within the same movement, emerge as a result 
of different forms of violence. When conducting research on the relationship between territorial 
claims and violence, it is also important to consider the idea that the direction of causality may 
change at various points during a conflict. For example, it may be possible that violence and 
intra-movement competition shapes initial factional claims over territory, but as these 
identifications become more entrenched, the territorial claims may begin to shape patterns of 
violence. 
More concerted efforts to map paramilitary ties to different neighborhoods will not only 
provide more reliable information on paramilitarism in general but will also allow for more 
accurate spatial analyses of nonstate targeting and violence. The data I gathered from Jarman 
appears promising but requires more intense cross-referencing and refining. The present data 
only covers current paramilitary claims and focuses largely on north and south Belfast. In 
additon to being limited in scope, this information does not necessarily match paramilitary 
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presence at other points between 1996 and  2013. In order to conduct a truly comprehensive 
study on territorialism and paramilitary activity, it would be necessary to identify areas of 
influence throughout the conflict. With this information, scholars could more accurately analyze 
variation in intra-movement and inter-factional violence.  
Conclusion 
When beginning this chapter, I had hoped to use information on Troubles-related 
fatalities, terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland, and territorial claims by paramilitaries to test H3 
and H4. After more closely examining the available data, I realized that it is not currently 
possible to undertake the types of spatial analyses I envisioned. My studies reinforce the need for 
research that critically examines the categories used to analyze political and criminal violence. In 
order to facilitate such studies, it will be necessary to develop better methods of measuring 
political violence and paramilitary activity. While each a fascinating topic in and of itself, more 
thorough exploration of how we might refine data collection methods lies outside the purview of 
this paper.  
87 
 
CHAPTER 6: Qualitative Analysis  
Evaluating H3: Continued Political Violence as Criminal Activity and Weak Leadership 
Scholars like O’Duffy, who have explored the influence of internal contestation on 
violence, would argue that violence continues during peace processes when weak political elites 
lose control over militant elements within their organizations. Former IRA-member Seanna 
Walsh, who describes violent anti-agreement republican groups as having no community support 
and no political or military strategy, echoed this idea when he observed that “It’s almost at times 
as if they exist as gun gangs.”102  Commentators observe that “[t]roubled though it may be, the 
evolving peace process has stripped the I.R.A. of much of its political mission,” causing many 
ex-paramilitaries to turn to crime.
103
 Furthermore, in 2005, “Chief Constable, Sir Hugh Orde, 
claimed that the dissidents’ only support comes ‘from a few nutters and idiots.’”104 According to 
O’Duffy and H3, men like McKevitt are either extremists interested in violence for the sake of 
personal greed and enrichment or weak leaders who cannot control the criminal impulses of their 
‘hard men.’ 
Comparative studies, however, challenge O’Duffy’s notion that criminality arises under 
conditions of weak leadership. Analyses of civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina suggest that “[t]he 
violence that erupted in Yugoslavia principally derived not from a frenzy of nationalism – 
whether ancient or newly inspired – but rather from the actions of recently empowered and 
unpoliced thugs.”105 Unlike O’Duffy who argues that thugs and criminals shape violence only 
under conditions of weak political leadership, Mueller claims that politicians may consciously 
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‘outsource’ violence to hooligans after which “recruited and encouraged by leading politicians 
and operating under a general framework of order provided by the army, a group of well-armed 
thugs…would emerge in an area where the former civil order had ceased to exist…As the only 
group willing – indeed sometimes eager – to use force, they would quickly take control.”106 
Arguments like Mueller’s not only contradict H3 but also demonstrate the importance of 
analyzing why and how politicians coordinate with and recruit ‘hard men.’ 
Closer examination of what John Horgan calls ‘violent dissident republicans’ 
(republicans committed to the continued use of violence after the GFA, or VDR) also challenges 
the idea that all post-accord violence in perpetrated by extremists who view violence as an end in 
and of itself or opportunists interested in using violence to enrich themselves. Horgan notes that 
members of VDR groups belong to one of two distinct generations: new republican recruits with 
“little to no adult experience of the Troubles…[and] dissident leadership figures and those with 
previous active service in the Provisional IRA and early CIRA exploiting opportunities to glorify 
active involvement in militant Republicanism.”107 The former IRA member and current 
nonviolent dissident is now a youth worker. He also reflected that “I do not see a groundswell of 
young people joining these organizations…The republican movement is made up of 
families…‘dissidents’ tend to be older, seasoned republicans.”108 This older generation includes 
men like McKevitt who have long histories of republican activity and, consequently, 
occasionally tense or hostile relationships with other republican leaders. 
Furthermore, many allegations of contemporary militants’ apolitical criminality 
emphasizes the frequency of punishment beatings and other efforts to establish control over a 
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neighborhood. ‘Community policing’ of low level crimes and neighborhoods, however, has long 
been a feature of the Northern Ireland conflict, and in fact “because the [P]IRA would have been 
involved in containing that sort of activity there is some sort of advantage [to VDR groups] to 
taking on that role.”109 In this sense, vigilante justice appears to be a strategic effort to establish 
groups’ legitimacy in the area rather than the product of rogue criminals and hard men. 
Evaluating H4: Continued Violence as Internal Contestation and Competition 
I argue that violence continues after the introduction of a peace process when political 
leaders like Michael McKevitt attempt to shift the balance of power away from their rivals. In 
some cases politicians may consider the recruitment of ‘hard men’ and thugs strategically 
beneficial, however, unlike Mueller, I do not consider greed and crime to be the primary 
motivating factor behind political violence. Ex-IRA/current nonviolent dissident republican #1  
echoed Pearlman’s theory when he noted that “I still don’t think today it [the formation of 
dissident republican groups] was about spoiling…[but rather] the goals and objectives of 
republicanism…I think spoiler politics is a good label to distract from genuine discussion about 
legitimate views.”110 Like Pearlman, I propose that VDR groups use violence as a way to 
challenge not the peace process itself but rather the ability of mainstream republicans to speak 
for the entire republican movement.  
This contest over legitimate representation is evident in McKevitt and the Army 
Executive’s rivalry with the Army Council. According to ex-IRA/current nonviolent dissident 
republican #1 McKevitt questioned the ability of “senior figures in Sinn Fein negotiation on 
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behalf of the republican movement.”111 While many members of Sinn Fein held parallel 
membership in the IRA, they were generally more representative of the Army Council than the 
Army Executive. ex-IRA/current nonviolent dissident republican #1 claims that the defection of 
1997 had its roots in a disagreement not about the peace process but rather about whether it was 
legitimate for “some leaders [to have] alleged that they had extra-dispensation to engage with 
British, representing parallel roles.”112 Despite the fact that the republican movement included 
members with a wide range of political opinions, “it [the dominant republican leadership] did not 
allow any political dissent within its ranks.”113 This tendency towards rigid hierarchy and the 
homogenization of political opinion is not uncommon among paramilitary organizations, and 
“Crenshaw has proposed that the proliferation of factionalism…may be largely due to the 
terrorist group’s aversion to internal dissent, or to borrow the parlance of Albert Hirschman they 
are averse to ‘voice,’ and often regard it as more detrimental than exit.”114  
Such debates over legitimacy explain the existence of dissident republicanism, but it does 
not necessarily explain the persistence of violent dissident behavior. From the perspective of 
VDR groups violence remains necessary because the political system as it is currently structured 
leaves no room for alternative forms of nonviolent republicanism. Because the dominant unionist 
and nationalist parties (the Democratic Unionist Party – DUP - and Sinn Fein, respectively) 
rarely compete for the same votes, meaning that it is in Sinn Fein’s interest to continue to quash 
dissent within the nationalist and republican communities. Rather than create opportunities for 
new republican parties to enter the political system, mainstream republicans cope with dissent 
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through a process of sidelining that involves “alienation, isolation, character defamation.”115 
These arguments raise numerous questions about the potential for political reform and debates 
over whether dissident republicanism could become a viable nonviolent political force. 
Unfortunately, a full exploration the feasibility of nonviolent options for expressing dissent lies 
outside the purview of this paper. 
In H4, I also expand upon Pearlman’s argument to account for the fact that “sometimes 
breakaway groups will be a group of mates who, when you talk to them, don’t really differ all 
that much on an ideological level from others.”116 As Morrison has noted, “Even when they 
found out what the real reason for the split was…they sometimes found themselves more in 
agreement with the side they were supposed to be opposing…but they stayed with these groups 
because of the trust.”117 H4 considers the possibility that local factions may also use violence as 
a way of competing among themselves for territory, resources, and power. I base my emphasis 
on local conditions on the fact that throughout the Troubles “there were a lot of politicized 
people, but the vast majority were reacting to what was happening in their streets and 
communities.”118 Republican paramilitaries have traditionally organized under a local brigade 
structure with paramilitaries recruiting neighborhood youth through different social and familial 
networks. When I asked Seanna Walsh how republicans decided which faction to join during the 
Troubles, he also noted that republicans aligned with different organizations because “there 
would be different on the ground circumstances that would affect different areas.”119 This 
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decentralized system caused paramilitaries to develop stronger identifications with their local 
brigades than with the larger Republican movement.  
In fact, the locus of power in Irish Republicanism has traditionally been at the 
neighborhood, community level. During the Irish War for Independence, IRA of 1919 was best 
described as a loose federation of actors. Units organized under local leadership and had little 
contact with or instruction from any centralized authority. This lack of an overarching leadership 
structure created patterns of violence that tended to be episodic in nature and caused the war to 
develop a highly regionalized character. Certain counties, particularly the south and west of the 
island bore the brunt of the violence for the war years. Interestingly, like in the Troubles and 
contemporary forms of paramilitary violence, regions with high levels of political violence had 
high levels of religious homogeneity. It is possible that homogeneous regions, which have denser 
CNR communities, are more likely to also include traditionally republican and politically active 
families. The fact that such regions have a larger sample of politically active republicans may 
increase the likelihood of locals deciding to initiate a skirmish with police or engage in feuds 
with their neighbors. Such explanations for the tendency of Irish Republican violence to cluster 
in ethnonationally and religiously homogeneous regions, however, are only exploratory, and the 
topic warrants future investigation. 
What the history of Irish Republicanism does reinforce, however, is the traditional 
importance of local community and familial ties in inspiring and sustaining republican sentiment 
and activity. Similarly to how ex-IRA men from the Troubles emphasize the importance of local 
conditions in determining whether they and their peers joined paramilitaries, in the 1920s, “when 
they volunteered as IRA men, they often did so as a group of bonded comrades together, local 
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young men in an actual as much as an imagined community.”120 M.L. Smith observes that, 
central to the division of pro-Treatyites and anti-Treatyites during the Irish Civil War, was 
“People seem often enough to have chosen a Civil War side because of individual ties to those 
whom they followed, admired, remembered or honoured…As the nation divided, new actual 
communities were build more tightly in rival relation to one another, and those often focused on 
love, friendship and intimate loyalty.”121 In fact, during the Civil War, lines of cleavage and 
violence often aligned with neighborhood rivalries and mirrored longstanding family feuds. As 
Hart observes, during the Irish Civil War, “family and faction dictated the course of the IRA split 
in units all over Ireland…Once again, it was the Brennans against the Barretts in Clare, the 
Hanniganites against the Manahanites in east Limerick, and the Sweeneys versus the O’Donnells 
in Donegal as all the old feuds were reignited.”122 
Given the similarities in recruitment and paramilitary structures among Irish republican 
paramilitaries of the 1920s, the Troubles, and contemporary Northern Ireland, I argue in H4 that 
local conditions and parochial interests continue to shape not only the recruitment and 
maintenance of paramilitaries but also the way these paramilitaries use violence. I base this 
argument both on the historical precedents mentioned earlier and on the patterns one observes 
when examining the loci of both violent and nonviolent dissident republican activity. In 2001, 
Human Rights Watch reported that  
Children's right to education was threatened in September in the Ardoyne area of Belfast 
where local protesters--who identify themselves as Protestant "loyalists" to the U.K.--
lobbed a blast bomb, tossed bottles, and shouted sectarian slurs at Holy Cross elementary 
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students, girls aged four to eleven, as they made their way to school. Loyalists issued 
death threats against some parents.
123
 
Elaine Kane Burns, a mother whose two children attended Holy Cross School at the time, 
continues to express frustration with the fact that the Holy Cross dispute made it seem as if 
nothing had changed for Ardoyne residents since the peace process. She notes that “it was still 
the same faces of the RUC, it was still the same machinery being used…and you saw Loyalists 
still being able to affect the lives of innocent people.”124 H4 predicts that regions like Ardoyne 
that where peace “has always been one foot in and one foot out…the slightest thing can ignite at 
any time” are more likely to become hotbeds of dissent and protest.125 Indeed, this same area 
belongs to the city council district where, in the 2014 Belfast City Council elections, during the 
twelfth and final vote count the SDLP’s Nichola Mallon won with 1,248 votes against 
independent candidate, Dee Fennell, who earned 1,087 votes.  This election caused great concern 
in Belfast, as Fennell is a vocal anti-agreement republican who at a recent Easter 
commemoration argued that armed struggle remained ‘legitimate’ in 2015. He claimed that “We 
are occupied by a foreign government, a foreign army and her agencies. The use of armed 
struggle to oppose this is our right…the important thing is to join the IRA. As you leave here 
today, ask yourself is it enough to support republicanism or could you be a more active 
republican?”126  
Fennell’s electoral performance evinces the influence local conditions continue to have 
on local Northern Irish politics and in some ways is unsurprising given the local politics of 
Ardoyne. When asked about VDR paramilitaries, Burns commented that the community tends to 
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support anti-agreement people like Fennell and members of VDR groups who are “there to lobby 
and highlight a strategy around addressing social need where they see the main parties have kind 
of ignored…replicating what the IRA did” and creating parallel structures through which they 
might fulfill community needs.
127
 The local politics of Ardoyne reinforce how “It’s important to 
know why people chose which side they went on and often times these decisions aren’t made 
because of the reasoning of the splits. At the time…people are making decisions because of what 
they’re hearing on the ground because of the people they trust themselves in their local 
neighborhoods.”128 
Conclusion 
Currently, most data-driven projects on conflict mapping have focused on fatalities or 
incidences of terrorism. This tendency is largely related to the availability of data. I argue, 
however, that focusing on this type of data is no longer sufficient given the combination of 
twenty-first century data analysis techniques and contemporary theories about how armed 
nonstate groups organize. Many studies have examined the relationship between Troubles-
related fatalities and either spatial segregation between Catholic and Protestant community 
members or deprivation levels across Northern Ireland; none of these studies, however, have 
examined patterns of violence during ceasefires and peace processes specifically, nor have they 
compared these patterns with patterns of violence outside of periods of political negotiation. As I 
demonstrated in Chapter 3, spatial analysis of political violence holds great potential to clarify 
the dynamics of post-accord political violence. To do this requires more refined data collection 
strategies, a critical reevaluation of how to measure political violence, and a concerted effort to 
understand local politics not only between but also within factions and organizations. 
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Based on the results of my quantitative and qualitative analyses, I hypothesize 
that political negotiations provide windows of opportunity for actors to capitalize on 
tensions that predate the peace process. Consequently, I would expect the divisions that 
emerge during peace processes to follow lines of cleavage that are consistent across 
periods of political negotiation and periods without great emphasis on political avenues 
for change. My windows of opportunity thesis suggests that higher frequencies of 
internal violence would accompany periods of political negotiation, but I would not 
expect patterns of internal violence, specifically cases of inter -factional, internal 
violence, to change in terms of spatial distribution, target types, and attack forms during 
peace processes.  
While one might initially expect to see more signs of inter-group conflict during 
periods of political negotiation, consistency of the targets, types of attacks, and spatial 
distribution suggests that lines of division within a movement have not changed with the 
introduction of a peace process. Instead, these preexisting differences have gained 
salience; therefore increasing the frequency with which violence occurs within a 
movement as factions compete militarily or constituents of one faction begin to align 
themselves with a competing faction. In contrast, if my hypothesis is incorrect and 
factionalism emerges out of peace processes, it would be reasonable to expect the 
violence that emerges during these periods to reflect new lines of division and, therefore, 
to be analytically distinct from earlier forms of internal violence.   
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CHAPTER 7: Conclusion 
Revisiting Explanations for CPV 
I have introduced four competing explanations for why armed nonstate actors continue to 
use CPV: H1 (security dilemma), H2 (spoiling behavior), H3 (political monopolies over the use 
of force), and H4 (windows of opportunity/vulnerability). When contrasting these hypotheses, it 
becomes clear the ways in which H4 differs from other explanations for the continued use of 
CPV.  
First, peace processes serve a notably different function in H1 and H2 from H4. Under 
H1 and H2, peace processes divide those within a movement who are willing to compromise and 
negotiate (moderates) from their hardline advocates of physical force and ideological purity 
(militants). This is the same behavior H3 predicts in the case of organizations with strong 
leadership; however H3 also predicts that disagreement over peace processes may catalyze less 
well organized groups to break into subgroups organized around the strongest local leaders, who 
– if they happen to be motivated by greed rather than political ideology – will use the language 
of agreement or opposition to a peace process to consolidate their control over the faction. H4 
suggests that peace processes weaken the common interest among coalition allies. This loss of a 
common interest alters nonstate actors’ calculus in so far as it changes, highlights, or allows for 
an opportunity to alter inequities within a movement’s internal balance of power.  
While H1 and H2 do not reject the notion that factionalization occurs outside periods of 
political negotiation, they do imply that, once a peace process is introduced, the process’s 
perceived legitimacy becomes the determinant of whether organizations use violent or 
nonviolent strategies. In contrast, H4 contends that, because peace negotiations weaken the 
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common interest among factions, the divisions that emerge follow lines of cleavage predating the 
ceasefire or peace process.  
A second difference among the hypotheses is the causal mechanisms behind 
factionalization and the continued use of force. Under H1, a crisis of credibility drives 
factionalization, while a desire to undermine the peace process compels actors to use violence 
according to H2. Under H4, violence occurs because actors see opportunities to shift the balance 
of power within a movement. Armed nonstate actors that continue using violence may, in fact, 
use force as a way to weaken a dominant faction or to win a seat at the negotiating table 
independently of the wider movement. Again, while H3 makes no direct mention of peace 
processes, one can infer that this hypothesis involves a hybrid of the patterns predicted by the 
other three: organizations with strong leadership will behave the way H1 or H2 predicts, while 
organizations with weak leadership may experience higher levels of fractionalization when the 
central leadership structure cannot effectively set an agenda. 
Finally, all four hypotheses predict different behavior from armed nonstate actors after 
the introduction of a peace process. According to H1, post-peace process violence will be 
reactionary and/or defensive, reflecting a sense of mistrust among actors. Incidents will 
largely involve inter-movement or inter-factional violence. Divisions within factions 
will generally reflect different degrees of confidence in the peace process or political 
actors. Under H2, “rogue” or “fringe” actors will use violence to create uncertainty, fear, 
and mistrust or to demonstrate that political negotiations will not bring security; 
factionalization reflects differences relevant to the peace negotiations. H3 argues that 
patterns of violence will change based on leadership’s strength and organization’s group 
cohesion. Well-organized groups with strong leadership will deploy violence against 
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politically strategic targets; factionalization will reflect different political visions; less 
well-organized groups may break into factions or use force in a seemingly random or 
apolitical fashion. Like H3, H4 argues that old rivalries emerge during periods of political 
negotiation; however H4 allows for the possibility that the rivalries may or may not be political 
in nature, focusing – instead – on broader issues of the balance of both political and economic 
power within and among factions. Lines of division that emerge will tend to follow 
preexisting cleavages and will reflect different (but not exclusively political) interests. 
Where interests are political, violence will mirror patterns predicted by H3. 
Consequently, in some cases paramilitaries may take hardline positions or align with militant 
elements of a movement in order to weaken their rivals rather than because these factions 
themselves hold radical or hardline views.  
My study revealed evidence that was consistently at odds with H1 and H2, most notably 
the consistency in patterns of violence before and after the peace process. Adopting a view of 
peace processes as the catalysts rather than the causes of division and CPV helps to explain these 
trends. While attempts to systematically test H3 and H4 revealed weaknesses in the way we 
collect and process data about political violence, preliminary tests and qualitative analyses 
provided evidence most consistent with H4. Some incidences of violence may be part of 
larger campaigns to undermine and disrupt peace talks, but I contend that it is also 
necessary to examine factionalization as a consequence of rivalries and parochial 
interests that pre-date any attempt to negotiate political settlements. I propose that, 
rather than creating new divisions within coalitional forces and movements, peace 
processes open windows of opportunity during which political and military elites can 
exploit existing divisions and consolidate power dynamics. Consequently, many cases of 
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what is commonly considered “spoiling behavior” may have less to do with disagreements over 
the actual participation in or rejection of political negotiations and more to do with internal group 
dynamics, intra-movement politics, and micro-level, parochial interests among local political and 
military leaders. Adopting this more nuanced vision of CPV not only more accurately predicts 
the types of violence one observes in Northern Ireland but also aligns more closely with 
contemporary understandings of substate organizations as nonunitary actors. 
Moving Forward 
Studying dissident republicanism complicates our understanding of ‘spoiler’ violence. It 
casts dissidents not as irrational, blood-thirsty “men of war” but rather as political actors capable 
of negotiation and political engagement but alienated by dominant actors.  In the case of 
Northern Irish republicanism, “spoilers” were a consequence of elite-negotiated peace and the 
fact that mainstream republicanism left no room for dissent. If a dominant faction holds too great 
a monopoly over the movement’s leadership and agenda it essentially ‘squeezes’ out certain 
elements. The process of delegitimizing these elements creates ‘spoilers.’ One can see evidence 
of this in the tiered system of membership within most dissident organizations: founding, 
alienated elites/”old guard” and the young new members without any political education who are 
frustrated with their existence and opportunities. 
Studying the reasons that coalitions disintegrate may shed light on how to rebuild 
alliances among factions or forge new coalitions when preparing to establish transitional 
governance structures. Examining factionalization as a consequence of internal 
competition among leaders rather than external pressure to either accept or reject a peace 
process suggests a model of paramilitary and substate military organization in which 
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elites coopt and exploit for their own gain legitimate grievances that a population holds. 
If not peace negotiations but rather chances for leaders to consolidate power cause 
organizations to split into factions, it is possible to imagine new or unconventional 
methods of buying off spoiler opposition movements or encouraging these groups to 
participate in political settlements.  
Internal dynamics of rebel groups are all the more important because, as the case 
of Northern Ireland shows, negotiating peace and transitional governance “depended 
ultimately on the leaders involved…The key challenge for the Government was to 
identify the positive elements within the opposing communities and to encourage and 
sustain them…and understanding the pressures on them from within their own movement 
or party and from outside.”129 My hypothesis conceptualizes actors like “republicans” or 
“loyalists” not as cohesive movements that may split in the face of disagreement but 
rather as heterogeneous assemblies whose constituent parts temporarily set aside their 
differences in the interest of achieving some form of collective action. It is still 
necessary to develop a more complete understanding of how H3 and H4 apply differently 
at the elite level and among the rank and file, if at all. This basic reframing of the 
‘spoiler’ debate, however, offers a promising basis for theory building not only about 
current threat levels from dissident republican or loyalist paramilit aries but also in 
regards to coalitions and factions about which we have little intelligence. In the face of 
information deficits regarding issues like the Syrian opposition movements, theorists can 
benefit from conducting in-depth case studies and comparative analyses of the ways 
paramilitary organizations have collaborated, divided, and operated in other civil wars. 





This is not to reject all current arguments about spoiling behavior as violence directed 
towards undermining peace processes; rather I hope to complicate discussions of 
political violence during periods of political negotiation by proposing an alternative 
model through which we might understand patterns of paramilitary violence and 
organization. 
  Northern Ireland has been described as having an “imperfect peace.”130  The question 
remains, however, what does this ‘imperfect peace’ look like and what does it mean for the 
definition and durability of peace? John Galtung identified two forms of peace: positive peace, or 
the absence of structural violence (cases in which there is no actor directly committing violence); 
and negative peace, the absence of personal violence (violence committed by an actor).
131
 The 
peace of the Belfast Agreement reflects neither positive nor negative peace, yet it is undeniable 
that – for the majority of Northern Ireland, life has dramatically improved since 1998. In a 
conversation this past summer, community worker Joe O’Donnell from the Belfast Interface 
Project noted that “for about 80% of the people here, Northern Ireland is a post-conflict society, 
but for that last 20%, they are still living very much in conflict.”132 Elaine Burns echoed this 
sentiment when, in reflecting on the Good Friday Agreement, she observed that “I think we did 
expect that we would see massive change…but those things in reality did not come to 
Ardoyne…What has been the dividend to people who suffered the most?...Nothing has really 
changed.”133  That patterns of violence do not change after the introduction of a peace process 
indicates that peace processes do not alter the nature of political violence. This continuity in 
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patterns of violence implies that what changes is not the type of violence that occurs but rather 
the way people categorize it. Continuity also highlights the importance of studying whether 
rebranding and delegitimizing violence truly makes for an equitable and durable peace. 
The process and strategies of delegitimizing violence also require further exploration. After 
1998, the British government and Northern Irish state began seeing returns on what had been a 
decades-long project: the criminalization of political violence in Northern Ireland. One of the 
most famous turning points in the Troubles was the election of Bobby Sands as a Westminster 
MP. “The sheer scale of Sands’ victory stunned Margaret Thatcher’s government. His 30,000 
votes gave the lie to the prime minister’s scathing dismissal of the IRA prisoners” as criminals 
and thugs acting without any public support.
134
With the introduction of the Belfast Agreement 
and the rebranding of Northern Ireland’s police service, what were formerly acts of war and 
political violence are now considered ‘anti-social behavior’ and acts of crime.  
While in retrospect many scholars consider Mrs. Thatcher’s uncompromising stance on the 
criminal status of IRA prisoners a mistake that prolonged cycles of violence, it is worth 
investigating this claim further. If, in fact, the peace of the Belfast Agreement is not the absence 
of personal or structural violence but rather the delegitimization and criminalization of armed 
struggle, does this vindicate Mrs. Thatcher’s overall strategy of counterinsurgency? Have recent 
efforts to delegitimize violence succeeded where Mrs. Thatcher’s counterinsurgency failed not 
because the grand strategy itself has changed but rather because authorities adapted the tactics 
through which they pursued this strategy? 
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Finally, what are the additional consequences of a counterinsurgency strategy and definition 
of peace that focuses on delegitimizing rather than eradicating violence? This study has 
demonstrated the ways that, from a scholarly perspective, strategies of delegitimization make it 
more difficult to accurately judge the levels of political violence occurring in an allegedly post-
conflict society. From a more practical standpoint, however, if political violence remains an 
active but largely unrecognized part of life for many in Northern Ireland, how can the state work 
to manage violence and protect its citizens? From the perspective of violent dissident 
republicans, the criminalization and delegitimization of armed struggle silence dissent from 
mainstream republicanism because the political system leaves no room for plurality within the 
republican-nationalist camp.  Is there a way of recognizing legitimate political grievances while 
delegitimizing the tactics used to express these frustrations?  
In response to questions about why he continues to report on Northern Ireland, a conflict 
many believe to have been sorted after the 1998 GFA, longtime Troubles journalist Peter Taylor 
notes that “All sorted it is not. In some places normality seems a veneer to hide the powerful 
undercurrents of bitterness and resentment that have never gone away.”135 This study has only 
scratched the surface of the ways in which it is practically, theoretically and intellectually 
beneficial to continue studying cases like Northern Ireland. It is only through more rigorous 
exploration of existing areas of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction that scholars 
and practitioners alike will be prepared to more effectively address future situations involving 
substate warfare and armed nonstate actors.  
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